Dynamic coopetition game between private label and national brand under carbon trading policy

Yu, Wenfang; Hou, Guisheng; He, Yu; Xin, Baogui

doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e14348

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In the area of differential games and dynamic spheres, a dynamic game model has been constructed to study the cooperation between private label (PL) retailers and national brand (NB) manufacturers under a carbon trading policy [18]. The Stackelberg differential game has been investigated for the optimal control of supply chain management marketing channels [19], and a modified Nerlove-Arrow model has been used to derive the equilibrium decisions of channel members [20].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operation Strategies of Green Supply Chain Members with Short-Sighted and Far-Sighted Behavior: A Differential Game Theory Approach

Guo¹,

Zhuang²,

Liu³

et al. 2023

JGELCD

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Operation Strategies of Green Supply Chain Members with Short-Sighted and Far-Sighted Behavior: A Differential Game Theory Approach

Guo¹,

Zhuang²,

Liu³

et al. 2023

JGELCD

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“…Solving the problem of industrial pollution is still an important part of the sustainable development of countries [4,34]. Although some domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a lot of research on the prevention and governance of industrial pollution on the background of the strategy of carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutrality [35], most of them focus on the formulation of national policies and when at the level of public participation, there are relatively few studies on how to manage industrial pollution efficiently. Based on the results of the previous research, this paper intends to analyze the evolutionary game of government and enterprise industrial pollution in regulatory supervision, use system dynamics to conduct empirical research on evolutionary decisions with system dynamics, as well as put forward constructive policy suggestions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Dynamic Evolution Game of Government, Enterprise and the Public to Control Industrial Pollution

Yu,

2024

Sustainability

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This paper proposes a two-party evolutionary game model of government and enterprise to solve the dilemma of industrial pollution control and explore the mode of government and enterprise collaborative governance. The local equilibrium points of the game model in four cases are calculated and analyzed, and the results show that government power alone cannot help enterprises achieve an ideal level of pollution reduction, and it is necessary to introduce public power for supervision. Based on the above, a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the government, the public, and the enterprise is proposed. When the costs and benefits of the tripartite game players meet certain conditions, the system will evolve to a state of equilibrium (0,1,1). Following the current situation of economic development in China, the parameters of the two-party and tripartite evolutionary game are assigned, and the operating path and system’s evolution trajectory of the two-party and tripartite industrial pollution control are simulated by Matlab R2016a software. It is indicated that whether the government participates in supervision or not, an enterprise will actively control pollution under strong public supervision, which can provide feasible suggestions for the selection of industrial pollution control policies.

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National brands versus store brands: retailer fight against national brands to improve store brands via a dynamic discount pricing strategy

Yahyavi,

Taleizadeh,

Thaichon

2024

Oper Res Int J

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Today, there is a lot of competition between competitors in the market of different products. The level of complexity of relationships and behavior of active players in the market has also increased. So that a manufacturer and retailer work together to increase the profit of the supply chain through the sale of products. On the other hand, the retailer and the manufacturer as competitors are competing with each other to sell more of their products. This issue has increased the complexity of the relationship between retailers and manufacturers. This study aims to explore how retailers can strengthen the self-introduced store brand (SB) and resist the pressures of manufacturers by using dynamic discount pricing (DDP) strategy. Numerical examples are proposed to clearly explain the validity and applicability of the model. Based on the managerial insights developed by analyzing the model's results, we evaluated the influences of DDP strategy on the retail prices and demands of national brands (NB) and SB and the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer. We found that discounts on the manufacturer's product by the retailer increase the demand for both NB and SBs. An increase in demand leads to an increase in the profits of manufacturers and retailers. However, the increase in the manufacturer's profit does not compensate for the decrease in his market share. In other words, the introduction of an SB always causes damage to the manufacturer, but the amount of damage depends on various factors. These findings offer manufacturers and retailers useful insights and help them adopt effective marketing strategies.

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Dynamic coopetition game between private label and national brand under carbon trading policy

Cited by 4 publications

References 53 publications

Operation Strategies of Green Supply Chain Members with Short-Sighted and Far-Sighted Behavior: A Differential Game Theory Approach

Operation Strategies of Green Supply Chain Members with Short-Sighted and Far-Sighted Behavior: A Differential Game Theory Approach

Analysis of the Dynamic Evolution Game of Government, Enterprise and the Public to Control Industrial Pollution

National brands versus store brands: retailer fight against national brands to improve store brands via a dynamic discount pricing strategy

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