Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination

Dutta, Rohan; Ishii, Ryosuke

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…For example, when contributing to a public good, it may be possible to make an initial non-refundable contribution and maintain the option of making additional contributions later, perhaps contingent on the contributions of others. And indeed such possibilities will expand the set of equilibrium outcomes, as can be seen from the work of Renou (2009), Bade, Haeringer, and Renou (2009), and more recently, Dutta and Ishii (2016), who specifically studied the power of partial commitments.…”

Section: Sequential Information Designmentioning

confidence: 97%

Sequential Information Design

Doval

Ely²

2020

ECTA

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We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.

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Section: Sequential Information Designmentioning

confidence: 97%

Sequential Information Design

Doval

Ely²

2020

ECTA

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“…The first two features guarantee that an equilibrium outcome of the one-period game remains an equilibrium of the multi-period game, a property which is not true even in zero-sum splitting games. Our multi-period analysis is also related to commitment games (Bade, Haeringer, and Renou, 2009;Renou, 2009;Dutta and Ishii, 2016) in the sense that revealing information is irreversible and allows designers to commit to subsets of continuation outcomes.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This game resembles dynamic commitments models, in particular the one of Dutta and Ishii (2016). Choosing a statistical experiment is a commitment to reveal some amount of information.…”

Section: Rectangular Corporation Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interactive Information Design

2018

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We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When the set of messages available to each designer is finite, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information about independent pieces of information, every equilibrium of the direct game (in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states) is an equilibrium with larger (possibly infinite) message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game. In an infinite-horizon multi-period extension of information design games, a feasible outcome which Pareto dominates a more informative equilibrium of the one-period game is supported by an equilibrium of the multi-period game.

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“…Remark 5. This game resembles dynamic commitments models, in particular the one of Dutta and Ishii (2016). Choosing a statistical experiment is a commitment to reveal some amount of information.…”

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confidence: 99%

Interactive Information Design

2022

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We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When each designer can choose information policies from a compact set of statistical experiments with countable support, such games always admit subgame-perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information, every equilibrium of the simple game in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states is robust in the sense that it is an equilibrium with larger and possibly infinite and uncountable message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, robust pure-strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal-form game in which the set of strategies of each designer is the set of outcomes induced by Bayes correlated equilibria in her corporation.

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Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Sequential Information Design

Sequential Information Design

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Interactive Information Design

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