Dynamic Address Validation Array (DAVA)

Abstract

This paper presents Dynamic Address Validation Array (DAVA), a novel moving target defense protocol for the Controller Area Network Bus (CAN bus). DAVA's primary goal is to mitigate the common CAN bus vulnerability of an unauthorized entity misappropriating components in the vehicle through sniffing and reusing ECU IDs for replaying messages. Using a dynamically allocated array stored in the ECU that is updated and validated frequently, DAVA limits an attacker's ability to reuse ECU IDs for replay attacks. The protocol strives to be minimally invasive and lightweight for application in CAN bus while still being secure. This paper discusses the DAVA protocol, a proof of concept implementation, and initial performance measurements. This paper explains how DAVA is able to provide a robust security framework for CAN bus without the need for a large amount of storage or CAN bus standard modification. CCS CONCEPTS • Networks → Naming and addressing; In-network processing; • Security and privacy → Information flow control;

IoDM: A Study on a IoT-Based Organizational Deception Modeling with Adaptive General-Sum Game Competition

“…On a micro level, MTD was combined with other elements such as Honey-X and decoys, thereby being conceptualized considering diversified mutation items. In addition, MTD is a potential "game-changing" security solution in special domains such as cyber-physical systems, autonomous vehicles, smart factories, and smart grids that have unprotected communication characteristics [3,[36][37][38][39][40].…”