Duverger's Law is Working in Italy

Reed, Steven R.

doi:10.1177/0010414001034003004

Cited by 86 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The main advantage of the Nagayama diagrams is that these diagrams can visually (i.e. more intuitively than other methods) display and compare the electoral outcomes for the degree of competition between the most successful parties (candidates), and the extent to which smaller parties (candidates) get a substantial share of votes (Reed, 2001;Taagepera, 2004;Grofman et al, 2004). In an effort to express in detail the characteristics of electoral competition, Grofman et al (2004) divide the Nagayama diagram into eight segments that would reflect the relative strengths of first-, second-and other-ranking parties (candidates).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Reed (2001) argued that the 1993 Italian mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, based largely on SMDs, confirmed the assumptions of Duverger's law, as most of the electoral districts moved closer to bipolar competition. Similarly, Reed (1990), analyzing election outcomes in Japanese elections in the period of 1947-1986 (when Japan used single non-transferable vote), confirmed the validity of the law of simple plurality elections (i.e.…”

Section: Theory: 'Micro-duvergerian' Agenda and Strategic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duvergerʼs Law in the second-order elections

Maškarinec¹

2016

Slovak Journal of Political Sciences

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This article tests Duverger's law through analysis of the Polish Senate elections in 2011 and 2015. These two elections were held under the new first-past-the-post (or single-member plurality) system, which replaced formerly used unlimited vote. The main aim of the article is to test, whether we can confirm the expectations of strategic voting in the context of the so-called second-order elections, as the Polish Parliament is a classical example of the asymmetrical bicameralism, with the secondary role of the upper chamber, the Senate. The results show that the strategic voting was not universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger's law. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-specific conditions, with potentially strong influence of the second-order character of the Polish Senate elections. KEY WORDS:Poland; second-order elections; party system; strategic voting; Duverger's law INTRODUCTIONRecent empirical research on voting in single-member districts (SMDs), based on extensive datasets of election results, demonstrated the general (although not perfect) validity of Duverger's law (1954), i.e., that the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition (Singer and Stephenson, 2009;Singer, 2013). However, most authors dealing with Duverger's original assumptions have been usually given considerable attention to the effects of electoral rules in the so-called first-order elections, i.e. elections to the lower chambers of the national parliaments, just because the lower chamber elections are crucial in the process of national government formation.3 1 This article is one of results of the project "Spatial analysis of voter behaviour and strategic voting", which was financially supported from funds for institutional research of the Faculty of Arts, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, for 2016.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory: 'Micro-duvergerian' Agenda and Strategic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duvergerʼs Law in the second-order elections

Maškarinec¹

2016

Slovak Journal of Political Sciences

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“…right-hand boundary of the APT shows a polarized party system, with just two leading contenders (see Reed, 1990Reed, , 2001Reed, , 2003and Diwakar, 2006). Grofman et al (2004) advocate sub-dividing the triangle display and counting the distribution of electoral district outcomes across the partitions thus created is a useful additional means of generating quantitative data for comparisons across elections.…”

Section: Graphic Representations Of Multi-party Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing multiparty competition in plurality rule elections

Dunleavy

Diwakar

2011

Party Politics

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Abstract:The study of general election outcomes can be helped by finding better approaches for visualizing large quantities of information and asking questions about its patterning. We review the Nagayama or 'all possibilities' triangle display, and show that it can only be legitimately used to show an overall 'field' of results that is logically feasible, called the effective space of competition, which varies with the number of observable parties. We apply this reductionist view to analyse outcomes in three leading plurality rule systems (the USA, India and Great Britain), focusing on evidence of the Duvergerian psychological effect acting on voters during campaign periods. The ECS view illuminates some key differences across countries, and variations with rising numbers of parties competing. We next consider a more holistic approach, the 'crown' diagram, which links electoral district outcomes more closely to the most important politico-ideological dimension in each country. Both views suggest some tentative evolutionary hypotheses for the variegated development of plurality rule systems over time. Britain is a highly nationalized party system, but one that has moved substantially away from Duvergerian predictions of two-party focusing, and towards multi-party politics. The USA seems to be a case of 'stunted development'. And India shows a partial Duvergerian conformity, yet combined with a substantial vertical scatter of non-Duvergerian results. Applications to over-time and regional analysis within countries are also sketched. In the comparative analysis of elections and party systems we have yet to develop logically acceptable ways to chart the district-level outcomes of multi-party elections, and to assess the clustering or patterning of outcomes in systematic ways. In this paper we show that the Nagayama or 'all possibilities' triangle has major defects, but can be reformulated and re-applied in two new ways. The first captures the 'layer cake' character of general election outcomes in a reductionist fashion, showing how the number of observable parties competing for votes at district level influencesoutcomes. An alternative variant (the crown diagram) gives a more holistic picture of outcomes, shifting attention to the performance of the top two parties or blocs linked to the predominant political-ideological dimension in a political system. We link this second innovation to a tentative logic of evolutionary development applicable to plurality rule election systems. Graphic representations of multi-party competitionIn his discussion of 'paradigms' in science, Thomas Kuhn (1996) emphasized that the term is meant to cover not just very basic or fundamental ideas that may lie at the heart of salient encompassing theory changes, but also to whole congeries (or 'swarms') of complementing ideas, methods, and practices, many of which concern instrumentation, measurement, schemas, and the analysis, representation and visualization of data (Buchanan, 2000, p. 233-4). There are still widespread problems of defect...

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“…27 Reed provides some evidence from the 1994 and 1996 elections that Duverger's Law is in fact working, and that the party system is moving toward bipolarity at district level. 28 That prime ministers are challenged 'because they can be challenged' risks being a tautology. Prime ministers can be challenged because they are weak.…”

Section: Political Culture Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%