Duration of Party Control in Parliamentary and Presidential Governments

Abstract

Most of the previous work on political stability uses cabinet duration or leadership duration to measure stability. This study, however, focuses on another area of stability, namely the party control of the executive branch. This approach not only allows us to compare political durability in presidential and parliamentary systems directly, but it also, we believe, better reflects policy changes that stem from government party composition. Our analysis of longitudinal data from 65 democracies reveals that presidential and parliamentary governments create different patterns of government survival. Ruling parties in parliamentary systems encounter a declining hazard rate over time, whereas those in presidentialism face an increasing hazard rate in their survival. We explain this difference by focusing on how parliamentary and presidential systems create different incentive structures for political parties.

Public Policy and Governance: Some Thoughts on Its Elements

“…They also suggest that the presidential government can be more responsible and timely to address the wishes of people. The accountability of government comes into a point between the two different system (Maeda, K., & Nishikawa, M., 2006). In terms of the stable policy pursuit and formation in more credit, the article also hints that the parliamentary system can be more resilient and in relatively long tracks despite its institutional agreement on instantaneity of switch and new election or cabinet.…”

“…Third, the article by Maeda and Nishikawa proposed the hypothesis and survey analysis concerning a durability of party control for administration, which should vary with the parliamentary and presidential form of government (Maeda, K., & Nishikawa, M., 2006). It shows a helpful point that the former form is more stable to seize the control in lengthier years.…”

“…We need, however, bear to keep dear from the corruptive tendency or law abiding attitudes about the policy network. They can keep on a continued stance with their favored party since the party, particularly in Japan, less swings nor sways on the instantaneous tide of constituents (Maeda, K., & Nishikawa, M., 2006). However, it also is a dominant factor what extent the governmental employees are permitted for the party affiliation and political activities.…”

The dynamics of within-regime stability: Party tenure and economic performance

“…10 Exogenous variables Xd. Few studies examine ruling party stability (as opposed to cabinet stability); we adopt control variables primarily from Maeda and Nishikawa (2006) as this study covers both presidential and parliamentary systems. We include four of these variables as exogenous regressors in the duration model.…”

“…In addition to the institutional controls suggested by Maeda and Nishikawa (2006), we also add two variables that capture the partisan political context. First, governments that are divided are expected to have shorter durations.…”