Dual processes, dual virtues

Abstract

I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm that both aim at. Instead, I unify them through their cognitive foundations. Because Type 1 and Type 2 cognition are complementary, reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. Thereby, this dual-process theory of epistemic virtue gives a naturalised account of virtues as well as an explanation of how reliabilism and responsibilism relate. This approach offers a solution for both the generality problem and the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology; additionally it preserves the epistemological autonomy of each virtue type.

The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue

“…As a result of this revision, Type 2 virtues are assigned to the same operational level (the level of cognitive foundations) as Type 1 virtues. Nevertheless, contrary to the common view of responsibilist virtues, Ohlhorst argues that a motivation to attain a specific epistemic goal is not constitutively necessary for Type 2 virtues (Ohlhorst 2022(Ohlhorst , 2249. At the same time, he contends that "the most excellent epistemic performance of Type 2 processes across the board will require a desire for truth" (Ohlhorst 2022(Ohlhorst , 2248.…”

“…She argues that an intellectual virtue includes both a motivation and a success condition. As a result, Zagzebski defines it as "an 6 E.g., Carruthers 2009, 109-10;Frankish and Evans 2009, 15-18;Evans and Stanovich 2013, 224-25, 236-37;Ohlhorst 2022Ohlhorst , 2242 7 Samuelson and Church 2015, 1099-1102Ohlhorst 2022Ohlhorst , 2246 Carruthers 2009, 110-11; Frankish and Evans 2009, 15-18; Evans and Stanovich 2013, 235-36; Ohlhorst 2022, 2242-44. 9 Samuelson and Church 2015, 1102-6; Mi and Ryan 2020; Ohlhorst 2022, 2247-50. admirable intellectual motive disposition and reliable success in reaching the truth because of the behavior to which that motive leads" (Zagzebski 2020, 103).…”

“…Consequently, Ohlhorst rejects the notion that Type 2 virtues play only auxiliary roles in the epistemic process (since they are not as truth conducive as Type 1 virtues). He takes the view that both virtues are equally constitutive of knowledge because in either case they are "key to explaining human cognition as it really occurs" (Ohlhorst 2022(Ohlhorst , 2252. With respect to imagination, this is an interesting move, given that Type 1 imagining is typically regarded as the "weak link" in the epistemic process.…”

“…Because of the speed with which it operates, however, there is a risk that this kind of cognition leads to inaccurate or simplified interpretations of a situation-for example, being influenced by cognitive biases or stereotypes. 6 Accordingly, the interpretations are reliable in specific settings, but "outside of those contexts they become unreliable" (Ohlhorst 2022(Ohlhorst , 2246.…”

“…In what follows, I examine the consequences of viewing imagination as an intellectual virtue that involves two kinds of cognitive processes known as Type 1 and Type 2 processing in contemporary literature. 1 The purpose of this essay is to expand on Michael T. Stuart's (2021 and2022) notion that our ability to imagine (imagination 0 ) entails Type 1 imagining (rapid, unconscious, and uncontrolled imagination 1 ) and Type 2 imagining (slow, conscious, and controlled imagination 2 ). On Stuart's account, these relate to the two basic approaches to virtue epistemology (reliabilist and responsibilist virtues).…”