Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow

Greene, Joshua D.

doi:10.1017/s0140525x22003193

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 37 publications

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“…The research on dual-process cognitive models continues today, focusing more on distinct yet integrated processes rather than distinct systems of reasoning. Scholars (for example, Augusto, 2023; Gigerenzer, 2008; Greene, 2023), and including Kahneman, have modified this strict dichotomy in reasoning while retaining important distinctions to understand the underlying neurocognitive and social mechanisms of reasoning that include the use of heuristics. There is recognition of the capacity to reflect and engage in more deliberative thinking about the automatic and emotion-based judgements, but it requires some effort and practice to override the more intuitive impulsive process.…”

Section: Moral Heuristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Distress as Moral Heuristic Missing the Mark

Reed

2024

Nurs Sci Q

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I propose that moral distress may function as a moral heuristic, and one that misses its mark in signifying a fundamental source for nurses’ moral suffering. Epistemic injustice is an insidious workplace wrongdoing that is glossed over or avoided in explicit explanations for nurse moral suffering and is substituted by an emphasis on the nurse’s own wrongdoing. I discuss reasons and evidence for considering moral distress as a moral heuristic that obfuscates the role of epistemic injustice as a fundamental constraint on nurses’ moral reasoning underlying moral suffering.

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Section: Moral Heuristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Distress as Moral Heuristic Missing the Mark

Reed

2024

Nurs Sci Q

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An empirical investigation of emotion and the criminal law: towards a “criminalization bias”?

Coppelmans,

Wagemans,

van Dillen

2024

Humanit Soc Sci Commun

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This interdisciplinary study, coupling philosophy of law with empirical cognitive science, presents preliminary insight into the role of emotion in criminalization decisions, for both laypeople and legal professionals. While the traditional approach in criminalization theory emphasizes the role of deliberative and reasoned argumentation, this study hypothesizes that affective and emotional processes (i.e., disgust, as indexed by a dispositional proneness to experience disgust) are also associated with the decision to criminalize behavior, in particular virtual child pornography. To test this empirically, an online study (N = 1402) was conducted in which laypeople and legal professionals provided criminalization ratings on four vignettes adapted from criminal law, in which harmfulness and disgustingness were varied orthogonally. They also completed the 25-item Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R-NL). In line with the hypothesis, (a) the virtual child pornography vignette (characterized as low in harm, high in disgust) was criminalized more readily than the financial harm vignette (high in harm, low in disgust), and (b) disgust sensitivity was associated with the decision to criminalize behavior, especially virtual child pornography, among both lay participants and legal professionals. These findings suggest that emotion can be relevant in shaping criminalization decisions. Exploring this theoretically, the results could serve as a stepping stone towards a new perspective on criminalization, including a “criminalization bias”. Study limitations and implications for legal theory and policymaking are discussed.

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Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow

Cited by 2 publications

References 37 publications

Moral Distress as Moral Heuristic Missing the Mark

Moral Distress as Moral Heuristic Missing the Mark

An empirical investigation of emotion and the criminal law: towards a “criminalization bias”?

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