Dual Networks in European Regional Development Policy

Abstract

This article seeks to extend the general analytical powers of the 'multi-level governance' (MLG) model of politics in the European Union. Empirically, we investigate the political dynamics of networks linking supranational, national, and subnational actors in EU regional development policy. Theoretically, we argue that interaction in these networks can be illuminated by an approach based on the structuralist logic of sociological network theory. Structuralist logic emphasizes how particular patterns of relationships -in this case, a supranational-national-subnational triad -shape actors' roles and strategies. Triads create opportunities for constantly shifting alliances, as relations between any two actors are affected by appeals to the third. The resulting * We thank the Harvard Program in State and Local Innovation and the University of California Center for German and European Studies for support in the preparation of this article. Earlier versions were presented at for their helpful comments and assistance along the way. We also thank Simon Bulmer and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We bear all responsibility for any remaining errors. 348 pattern of interaction, which we call 'dual network dynamics', corresponds well to observed conflict and co-operation in EU regional development policy.

The history and evolution of Cohesion policy

“…For this reason, the Commission promised that it would promote all possible initiatives 'to align agents before the race starts' (Bailey and De Propris 2002: 409). At the same time, however, it also became clear to the Commission that involving regional actors in decision-making would help to strengthen its own position in this specific policy area as a broker of agreements between the actors involved (Ansell et al 1997;Hooghe 1996).…”

Support from below? Supranational institutions, regional élites and governance preferences

“…Regional actors have no default bias towards the Commission. If central government or other institutions can be allies in the policy game, they will not seek solace elsewhere, be it in terms of direct interest representation in Brussels (Ansell et al 1997;Tatham 2010), lobbying for constitutional change at the EU level (Bauer 2006;Jeffery 2007) or governance preferences towards the Commission (this paper). The second concerns perceived country benefits.…”

Center–Periphery Alignments and Political Contention in Late-Modern Europe

“…2001). And finally, these Europeans are learning to profit from "dual networks" with national governments and supranational authorities (Ansell, Parsons and Darden 1997).…”

“…Such alignments do not lead to local revolts against "nationalizing princes," as in te Brake's model, but to concerted lobbying efforts and coordination of policy between subnational and national elites facing European rules and officials. The result is not territorial exit but brokerage between subnational and supranational actors by national states (Ansell, Parsons and Darden 1997).…”

“…1996) -but it did not flirt with regional exit. Although the role of national governments in deciding on the allocation of funds was increased in the 1990s, structural policy is one of the few areas where the EU, under a unique system of "partnerships," intervenes directly in the implementation of Community funding and has developed privileged relations with subnational actors (Ansell, Parsons and Darden 1997). This gives EU administrators leverage against national governments by encouraging some kinds of regional projects over others, stimulating the organization of forces vives in the regions they work with, and occasionally overcoming national resistance.…”