Dual Coding, Reasoning and Fallacies

Hample, Dale

doi:10.1080/00028533.1982.11951228

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Creativity often involves imagery (Shepard, 1978), and imagery is nonlinear, nonsequential, nonverbal, and not disciplined by logic (Paivio, 1971). Logic is associated primarily with verbal behavior, which is sequential and inferentially disciplined (Hample, 1982). Though creativity is certainly cognitive, it may not be logical in its originative impulses.…”

Section: Unconsciousness and Logicmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Logic, conscious and unconscious

Hample

1986

Western Journal of Speech Communication

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Section: Unconsciousness and Logicmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Invention is commonly asserted to have alogical characteristics (Hample, 1982;Haugeland, 1981, p. 18;Koestler, 1964, pp. 35-36;Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967, p. 253).…”

Section: Unconsciousness and Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic, conscious and unconscious

Hample

1986

Western Journal of Speech Communication

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“…Rather, heuristics are characterized in terms of mental shortcuts through expert knowledge domains which lie beyond the cognitive grasp of the lay person. Heuristics on this 17 With the exception of Hample (1982Hample ( , 1985Hample ( , 1988, few other argumentation and fallacy theorists have attempted to set fallacies within a cognitive framework. One prominent fallacy theorist, John Woods, acknowledges the paucity of work in this area when he states that "an account of fallacies needs to be set in a more general theory of cognitive agency " (2004: xxvi). conception are bypassing subject knowledge, not the critical questions that attend argumentation schemes à la Walton.…”

Section: Partial Expertisementioning

confidence: 99%

Informal Fallacies as Cognitive Heuristics in Public Health Reasoning

Cummings

2014

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Abstract:The public must make assessments of a range of healthrelated issues. However, these assessments require scientific knowledge which is often lacking or ineffectively utilized by the public. Lay people must use whatever cognitive resources are at their disposal to come to judgement on these issues. It will be contended that a group of arguments-so-called informal fallacies-are a valuable cognitive resource in this regard. These arguments serve as cognitive heuristics which facilitate reasoning when knowledge is limited or beyond the grasp of reasoners. The results of an investigation into the use of these arguments by the public are reported.Résumé: Le public doit faire des évaluations d'un éventail de questions liées à la santé. Cependant, ces évaluations nécessitent des connaissances scientifiques que souvent le public n"a pas ou utilise mal. Les profanes doivent utiliser toutes les ressources cognitives qui sont à leur disposition pour aboutir à un jugement sur ces questions. Il sera soutenu qu'un groupe d'arguments -soidisant sophismes non formels -sont une ressource cognitive précieuse à cet égard. Ces arguments servent d"heuristiques cognitives qui facilitent le raisonnement lorsque la connaissance est limitée ou au-delà de la compréhension des raisonneurs. On signale les résultats d'une enquête sur l'utilisation de ces arguments par le public.

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Argument as Cognition: A Putnamian Criticism of Dale Hample's Cognitive Conception of Argument

Cummings

2004

Argumentation

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Dual Coding, Reasoning and Fallacies

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

Logic, conscious and unconscious

Logic, conscious and unconscious

Informal Fallacies as Cognitive Heuristics in Public Health Reasoning

Argument as Cognition: A Putnamian Criticism of Dale Hample's Cognitive Conception of Argument

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