Dual-channel recycling e-waste pricing decision under the impact of recyclers’ loss aversion and consumers’ bargaining power

Li, Zhen; Jia, Zhao; Meng, Qingfeng

doi:10.1007/s10668-021-01916-w

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…With the continuous improvement in Internet technology and people's awareness of sustainable development, online and offline dual-channel recycling channels have begun to attract the attention of remanufacturers [33,34]. Online recycling has gradually become an effective way for remanufacturers to recycle waste products [35], and dual-channel RSC management combining online and offline recycling is of particular importance [33]. Feng et al [36] used the RSC of dual-recycling channels including online recycling channels and discussed the advantages of dual-recycling channels over single-recycling channels.…”

Section: Recycling Channels Of the Reverse Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Wang

2023

Mathematics

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In the existing recycling system for end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), online recycling based on the Internet platform is a useful supplement. In this paper, a Stackelberg game pricing model, which is dominated by ELV part remanufacturers and composed of remanufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, is constructed considering consumer preferences for recycling channels. The influence of different subsidy strategies on the optimal pricing, profit, and recycling volume of the reverse supply chain (RSC) of ELVs is discussed, and the effects of factors such as subsidy amount and consumer preferences on the RSC of ELVs are analyzed using numerical simulation. The results show that the increase in consumers’ online recycling preferences has a positive effect on the recycling volume and profit of the RSC of ELVs. Considering the recycling volume of the RSC, when fewer subsidies are given, more recycling volume can be generated by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, recycling volume will be generated by subsidizing consumers. Considering the profit of the RSC, when subsidies are given at the lower-middle level, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing consumers.

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Section: Recycling Channels Of the Reverse Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Wang

2023

Mathematics

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“…And they further studied the manufacturer's channel intrusion decision-making strategy under the two modes of manufacturer recycling and retailer recycling, and analyzed its impact on retailers, supply chain system, and consumer surplus [24]. Li et al [25] discussed the recovery pricing decision of dual channel reverse supply chain under the dual influence of recyclers' loss aversion and consumers' bargaining power. When the ratio of the recycling price to recycling competition coefficient is large, the mixed recycling channel composed of manufacturers, retailers, and thirdparty recyclers can better maintain the coordination and stability of the supply chain [20].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Network Externalities and Recycling Channels on Closed-loop Supply Chain Operation Incorporating Consumers’ Dual Preferences

Xie

Zhao

et al. 2022

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Consumers’ awareness of environmental protection is gradually strengthened, and they often consider environmental protection characteristics of products during purchasing products. Based on the characteristic of consumers’ dual preferences for product quality and environmental friendliness, this paper constructs a novel closed-loop supply chain with network externalities for new products and remanufactured products under different waste product recycling channel strategies. It discusses the influence of product recycling channel strategies and network externalities on the optimal decision of the company. By establishing the Stackelberg game model, the analysis found that the retail price of new products and remanufactured products is not affected by network externalities and recycling channel strategies, even if the wholesale price of remanufactured products increases with the influence of network externalities. The changing trend of market demand for new products and remanufactured products is different between products with network externalities and without network externalities. When the cost of remanufactured products is within certain range, the existence of network externalities makes the market demand for new products and remanufactured products increase simultaneously. Our study also found that even if products have positive network externalities that increases consumer utility, when the cost of remanufactured products is outside certain range, the company’s profit will be higher when products have no network externalities than that when products have network externalities.

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“…Channel management, especially the selection of recycling channels for waste products, is an important issue in reverse supply chain management [7,14,15]. Numerous scholars have studied the recycling channels of waste products and pointed out the impact of recycling channels' selection on product pricing and enterprise earnings in the CLSC [6,8,[16][17][18]. Recently, Internet platforms have played important roles in waste recycling [19].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Research on Three-Player Evolutionary Game in Waste Product Recycling Supply Chain System

Xie

Cheng

2022

Systems

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Recycling channel construction plays an important role in the development of closed-loop supply chains. In particular, the emergence of online recycling channels has made up for the shortcomings of traditional recycling channels with poor information and limited markets. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model to investigate the cooperation between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms with government intervention or not. The result shows that whether an enterprise actively participates in the cooperative recycling depends on the actual cost of establishing the cooperative recycling system. Additionally, the government support and supervision will affect the actual cost of cooperation. When the actual cost of establishing a collaborative recovery system is very large, under the influence of government interventions, there will be two kinds of evolutionary results for enterprises, either with cooperation or not at the same time. On the contrary, when the actual cost is small or medium, both manufacturers and the platforms will choose to cooperate. Thus, government participation in a cooperative recovery system is the best strategic option.

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Dual-channel recycling e-waste pricing decision under the impact of recyclers’ loss aversion and consumers’ bargaining power

Cited by 14 publications

References 37 publications

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Effects of Network Externalities and Recycling Channels on Closed-loop Supply Chain Operation Incorporating Consumers’ Dual Preferences

Dynamic Research on Three-Player Evolutionary Game in Waste Product Recycling Supply Chain System

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