Dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination with a reward-driven remanufacturing policy

Saha, Subrata; Sarmah, S.P.; Moon, Ilkyeong

doi:10.1080/00207543.2015.1090031

Cited by 168 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…In addition, for the study of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, the government is a factor that cannot be ignored. Considering the government's incentives for the recycling of waste products in the closed-loop supply chain, the work of Ma et al [15] and Saha et al [16] is based on consumer alignment. The difference in sale channel preferences between upper and lower lines studies the impact of government subsidy behavior on the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy and the changes in profit before and after subsidies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the inverse induction method [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]18] and using Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Champaign, IL, USA) software, we can know:…”

Section: Pricing Strategy In the Manufacturer's Direct Recycling Modementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, the optimal profits of offline retailers, online retailers, and manufacturers are [16][17][18][19][20]22]:…”

Section: Pricing Strategy In the Manufacturer's Direct Recycling Modementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to solve the above problems, it is necessary to directly recycle the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain under the third-party recycling model. The fair concern of the seller is the establishment of a suitable contract to achieve closure optimization of the ring supply chain to achieve Pareto optimality.The existing research [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] does not consider the horizontal fairness between retailers of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, which will lead to an inadequate understanding of pricing issues.The main contribution of this paper is to provide a comprehensive and innovative performance framework to compare the direct and third-party recovery mode in a dual-channel supply-chain management system. This study provides the performance comparison of supply chain members between two different dual-channel supply chain structures.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existing research [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] does not consider the horizontal fairness between retailers of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, which will lead to an inadequate understanding of pricing issues.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

et al. 2018

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In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the inverse induction method [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]18] and using Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Champaign, IL, USA) software, we can know:…”

Section: Pricing Strategy In the Manufacturer's Direct Recycling Modementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, the optimal profits of offline retailers, online retailers, and manufacturers are [16][17][18][19][20]22]:…”

Section: Pricing Strategy In the Manufacturer's Direct Recycling Modementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

et al. 2018

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The impacts of subsidy strategies and recycling modes on the closed‐loop supply chain

Song

Zhang

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper explored the effect of government subsidies and recycling modes on a four‐echelon closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC) including a government, a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third‐party recycler. The government directly subsidizes remanufacturing activities, recycling activities, or consumption activities with social welfare maximization objective. Meanwhile, the used products can be recycled by the retail, the third party, or both. We developed nine Stackelberg game models and derived the optimal decision and the equilibrium revenue of all members. Then, the optimal subsidy intensity, retail price, and wholesale price under different scenarios were compared theoretically. Finally, we analyzed the sensitivity of all stakeholders' optimal decisions and revenue to important parameters. Some novel and meaningful conclusions were established: (a) Government directly subsidy for remanufacturing has the same effect as subsidy for recycling; (b) it is better for the government directly subside manufacturing when two recyclers participate under the uncertainty of manufacturing cost or potential market; (c) all members should intervene the recycling cost coefficient, the costs saved of remanufacturing unit used product, and the price elasticity coefficient; (d) it is a conservative and effective strategy for the government to directly subside consumption activities.

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Strategic cooperation of live‐stream platform in e‐commerce

Wang

Guo

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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Many live‐stream platforms (LSPs) have sought cooperation with e‐tailers or/and manufacturers. Considering the existing cooperation modes, we propose models to examine the optimal cooperation mode. Our study shows that the LSP benefits from cooperating with both firms. Moreover, the manufacturer profits from the LSP only cooperating with itself, while the e‐tailer may profit from the LSP only cooperating with itself or the manufacturer. The consumers benefit from the LSP only cooperates with one firm. We further consider the case where the manufacturer's LS channel is not inferior to the e‐tailer's channels and examine the equilibrium strategies for players and consumers.

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Dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination with a reward-driven remanufacturing policy

Cited by 168 publications

References 33 publications

An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

The impacts of subsidy strategies and recycling modes on the closed‐loop supply chain

Strategic cooperation of live‐stream platform in e‐commerce

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