Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives

Nadelmann, Ethan A.

doi:10.1126/science.2772647

Cited by 206 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(2 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…33,34 Effectiveness of drug law enforcement The effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and lack of serious unintended negative consequences of harm reduction 5,35 stands in stark contrast to the relative ineffectiveness, costinfectiveness and serious unintended negative consequences of drug law enforcement. 36 Yet drug law enforcement is the mainstay of the response to illicit drugs by governments in Australia and other countries and the major beneficiary of government resources. 37 An increasing number of studies suggest that vigorous drug law enforcement can inadvertently increase the potential for transmission of HIV and other bloodborne infections among IDUs.…”

Section: Health Education Of Injecting Drug Usersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effectiveness of harm reduction in preventing HIV among injecting drug users

Wodak¹,

Maher²

2010

NSW Public Health Bull.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Health Education Of Injecting Drug Usersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effectiveness of harm reduction in preventing HIV among injecting drug users

Wodak¹,

Maher²

2010

NSW Public Health Bull.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Instead, in these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market share (for a case study, see Mieczkowski, 1990). This relationship plays a major role in the current debate on the pernicious effects of the illegality of drug trade and the War on Drugs (see, for example, Nadelmann, 1989, Miron and Zwiebel, 1995, The Economist, 2001, and Keefer and Loayza, 2010. Historical episodes such as the American alcohol prohibition and the Opium Wars in China seem to support this view, but there is scant causal evidence on the effect of illegality on violence and skeptical views are common (see Naylor, 2009, or discussion in Fagan andChin, 1990, andDonohue et al, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Use of Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Mahogany Trade in the Brazilian Amazon

Chimeli

Soares

2017

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Agents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee property rights, to enforce contracts, or to seek protection from competitors' improper behaviors. In these contexts, violence is used to enforce previous agreements and to fight for market share. This relationship plays a major role in the debate on the pernicious effects of the illegality of drug trade. This paper explores a singular episode of transition of a market from legal to illegal to provide a first piece of evidence on the causal effect of illegality on systemic violence. Brazil has historically been the main world producer of big leaf mahogany (a tropical wood). Starting in the 1990s, policies restricting extraction and trade of mahogany, culminating with prohibition, were implemented. First, we present evidence that large scale mahogany trade persisted after prohibition, through misclassification of mahogany exports as "other tropical timber species." Second, we document relative increases in violence after prohibition in areas with: (i) higher share of mahogany exports before prohibition; (ii) higher suspected illegal mahogany activity after prohibition; and (iii) natural occurrence of mahogany. We believe this is one of the first documented experiences of increase in violence following the transition of a market from legal to illegal. NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARYAgents operating in illegal markets cannot resort to the justice system to guarantee...

show abstract

“…Nadelmann 1988Nadelmann , 1989Nadelmann , 1992Nadelmann , 2004 But, as I will show, this critique can in fact direct us to the analytical heart of the problem and point to a way out of the present intellectual and policy impasse. Let me begin with the crux of the matter for the reformers, as pithily expressed by Rolles (2010:128) in an influential piece in the British Medical Journal:…”

Section: Drug Control and Market Orderingmentioning

confidence: 99%