Drone-MAP: A Novel Authentication Scheme for Drone-Assisted 5G Networks

A location‐aware physical unclonable function and Chebyshev map‐based mutual authentication mechanism for internet of surveillance drones

“…In the proposed director drone ‐ associate drone mutual authentication protocol, the director drone stores $$$ C{h}_j $$$, $$$ H{P}_j $$$, $$$ ID{M}_j $$$, $$$ ID{P}_i $$$, and a Chebyshev polynomial and the storage cost is 768 bits; whereas the associate drone stores only $$$ ID{M}_j $$$, $$$ ID{P}_i $$$, initial challenge, and helper data making the storage cost of 608 bits. The storage cost of proposed protocol 1 is 640 bits, which is lower than the works of Jan et al, 32 Li et al, 64 and Nyangaresi et al, 39 and only slightly higher than Alladi et al, 41 Ko et al, 43 Pu et al, 17 and Alladi et al 16 The main advantage of the proposed protocol is that no secret keys are stored in drone memory and only variables and nonsensitive data need to be stored in drone memory that are refreshed after each session. This makes the system fail‐safe and secure even if the drone is captured.…”

“…However, they have not addressed clonability of drones and the mutual authentication between the entities. Alladi et al 41 introduced a PUF‐based mutual authentication mechanism between drone and the 5G base station without confirming the drone location and not considering the insider attacks and drone‐to‐drone communication. Cabuk et al 42 discussed the authentication for a group of drones using context information without a ground station.…”

A Review on Software-Based and Hardware-Based Authentication Mechanisms for the Internet of Drones

“…In addition, simulation results were provided to ascertain the performance of this authentication protocol in NodeMCUv3.0 and Raspberry Pi 3B simulation environments, when several mathematical and cryptographic operations (e.g., XOR, pseudo-random number generation (PRNG), and hash functions) were carried out. In [71], Drone-MAP, a mutual authentication protocol for 5G UAV-aided backhaul networks, was proposed to avoid common security attacks (e.g., eavesdropping, impersonation, and replay attacks). The goal of this protocol was to establish secure sessions and meet the confidentiality and untraceability requirements in communication scenarios with a single BS and multiple UAVs.…”

UAV-Based Privacy-Preserved Trustworthy Seamless Service Agility for NextG Cellular Networks

“…Therefore, recent UAV security research works are targeting designing lightweight authentication protocols that will not burden the UAVs. For instance, the authors in [ 21 ] proposed a two-stage mutual authentication protocol for Software-Defined Network (SDN)-based multi UAV networks operating in surveillance areas.One of the most recent works is [ 22 ], the authors proposed a lightweight Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based mutual authentication scheme for UAV flying base station in a 5G network. The authentication in [ 22 ] achieves secure authentication without the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or any time-consuming encryption.…”

“…For instance, the authors in [ 21 ] proposed a two-stage mutual authentication protocol for Software-Defined Network (SDN)-based multi UAV networks operating in surveillance areas.One of the most recent works is [ 22 ], the authors proposed a lightweight Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based mutual authentication scheme for UAV flying base station in a 5G network. The authentication in [ 22 ] achieves secure authentication without the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or any time-consuming encryption. However, the scheme assumes a trusted 5G infrastructure and does not take into consideration mutual authentication.…”