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2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2016.11.011
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DroidNative: Automating and optimizing detection of Android native code malware variants

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Cited by 95 publications
(71 citation statements)
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“…This is the case of APIs that load dynamic code, use reflection or use of cryptography. These are specially relevant to malware detection as they enable the execution of dynamic code [34] and allow the deobfuscation of encrypted code [3]: i) JAVA NATIVE: This API category captures libraries that are used to bridge the Java runtime environment with the Android native environment. The most relevant API in this category is java.lang.System.loadLibrary(), which can load ELF executables prior to their interaction through the Java Native Interface (JNI).…”
Section: A Behaviorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This is the case of APIs that load dynamic code, use reflection or use of cryptography. These are specially relevant to malware detection as they enable the execution of dynamic code [34] and allow the deobfuscation of encrypted code [3]: i) JAVA NATIVE: This API category captures libraries that are used to bridge the Java runtime environment with the Android native environment. The most relevant API in this category is java.lang.System.loadLibrary(), which can load ELF executables prior to their interaction through the Java Native Interface (JNI).…”
Section: A Behaviorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We refer the reader to Appendix A 2 Other Dalvik executables and APKs embedded into the main app (see Section II-B). 3 Such as the busybox toolbox. for an illustrative example of the type of text executables embedded within the resources of an app.…”
Section: B Text Executablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [84], the same concept of control flow graph was used to build API calls' graphs and construct semantic signatures to detect unknown malware variants. Also, in [85], the control flow graphs have been built based on native code for constructing semantic signatures that can be used to detect malicious behaviour in both bytecode or native code. • Data dependency graph DDG is a common program analysis structure which represents inter-procedural flows of data through a program [86].…”
Section: Semantic Featuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [105], a Program Dependence Graphs (PDG) has been used to construct semantic code-based signatures to detect the code similarity between apps. Also, in [85], semantic-based signatures have been generated based on the Annotated Control Flow Graph (ACFG) to detect suspicious behaviour in app's native code. The analysed applications have been broken up into a set of ACFGs to construct its signature, and if the constructed signature matches a malware pattern within a given threshold, the app is labelled as malware.…”
Section: Detection Phasementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent work suggested that native code had been widely used [21,22,47] in Android apps, which severely complicates the process of static analysis. As Java bytecode can be easily decompiled, malware developers usually hide the malicious payload and core functionalities in the native code to evade detection [6,7,18,21].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%