“Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare

Abstract

Why do some wars result in the intentional killing of large numbers of civilians? In this article we examine the incidence of mass killing in all wars from 1945 to 2000+ In the statistical analysis of our data set of 147 wars, we find strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that mass killing is often a calculated military strategy used by regimes attempting to defeat major guerrilla insurgencies+ Unlike conventional military forces, guerrilla armies often rely directly on the local civilian population for logistical support+ Because guerrilla forces are difficult to defeat directly, governments facing major guerrilla insurgencies have strong incentives to target the guerrillas' civilian base of support+ We find that mass killing is significantly more likely during guerrilla wars than during other kinds of wars+ In addition, we find that the likelihood of mass killing among guerrilla conflicts is greatly increased when the guerrillas receive high levels of active support from the local population or when the insurgency poses a major military threat to the regime+ There is an African saying that describes the plight of civilians during times of war: "When elephants fight, the grass suffers+" Indeed, the killing of civilians is a common consequence of armed conflict+ We estimate that between thirteen and twenty-six million civilians have died in civil, international, and colonial wars since 1945+ 1 All too frequently, however, civilian deaths during war are not merely "collateral damage," as the African proverb might suggest+ In this article we argue For their helpful comments on previous versions of this article the authors thank Bear Braumoeller,

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Selective Leviathans: Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation

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