Dose assessment in the criticality accident at Tokai-mura

Endo, Akira

doi:10.1016/j.radmeas.2010.05.015

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Fortunately, the radiation doses from the Fukushima accident were not high enough to cause any deterministic effects or acute radiation sickness and thus the use of the equivalent dose was appropriate and valid. The problem created by the lack of a formal quantity for a radiation-weighted dose for high doses was identified at the time of the Tokai-Mura accident (Endo 2010) (when a de facto neutron weighted dose had to be created to deal with the situation) but remains unsolved.…”

Section: Radiation-weighted Quantities For High Dosesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radiological protection issues arising during and after the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident

González¹,

Akashi²,

Boice

et al. 2013

J. Radiol. Prot.

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Following the Fukushima accident, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) convened a task group to compile lessons learned from the nuclear reactor accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, with respect to the ICRP system of radiological protection. In this memorandum the members of the task group express their personal views on issues arising during and after the accident, without explicit endorsement of or approval by the ICRP. While the affected people were largely protected against radiation exposure and no one incurred a lethal dose of radiation (or a dose sufficiently large to cause radiation sickness), many radiological protection questions were raised. The following issues were identified: inferring radiation risks (and the misunderstanding of nominal risk coefficients); attributing radiation effects from low dose exposures; quantifying radiation exposure; assessing the importance of internal exposures; managing emergency crises; protecting rescuers and volunteers; responding with medical aid; justifying necessary but disruptive protective actions; transiting from an emergency to an existing situation; rehabilitating evacuated areas; restricting individual doses of members of the public; caring for infants and children; categorising public exposures due to an accident; considering pregnant women and their foetuses and embryos; monitoring public protection; dealing with 'contamination' of territories, rubble and residues and consumer products; recognising the importance of psychological consequences; and fostering the sharing of information. Relevant ICRP Recommendations were scrutinised, lessons were collected and suggestions were compiled. It was concluded that the radiological protection community has an ethical duty to learn from the lessons of Fukushima and resolve any identified challenges. Before another large accident occurs, it should be ensured that inter alia: radiation risk coefficients of potential health effects are properly interpreted; the limitations of epidemiological studies for attributing radiation effects following low exposures are understood; any confusion on protection quantities and units is resolved; the potential hazard from the intake of radionuclides into the body is elucidated; rescuers and volunteers are protected with an ad hoc system; clear recommendations on crisis management and medical care and on recovery and rehabilitation are available; recommendations on public protection levels (including infant, children and pregnant women and their expected offspring) and associated issues are consistent and understandable; updated recommendations on public monitoring policy are available; acceptable (or tolerable) 'contamination' levels are clearly stated and defined; strategies for mitigating the serious psychological consequences arising from radiological accidents are sought; and, last but not least, failures in fostering information sharing on radiological protection policy after an accident need to be addressed with recommendatio...

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Section: Radiation-weighted Quantities For High Dosesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radiological protection issues arising during and after the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident

González¹,

Akashi²,

Boice

et al. 2013

J. Radiol. Prot.

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“…In fact, the ICRP-74 conversion factors are also helpful to improve the C/M ratios in this study. [5], uniform air density 1.135E-3 g/cm 3 . Table 4 shows the detailed TRIPOLI-4 calculated photon skyshine dose rates from the RA reactor.…”

Section: Tripoli-4 Skyshine Dose Rates Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lateral biological shielding was made of heavy serpentinite concrete with pig-iron fraction as a filler (density 3.27 g/cm 3 ). This shielding was arranged around the core and reflectors and was lined with a steel box-type structure.…”

Section: The Ra Reactor Building and Biological Shieldingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Storage facilities of spent fuels, waste drums, and used components like steam generators [2], have also appropriate shielding to attenuate the neutron and/or photon skyshine dose. However, during the 1999 JCO criticality excursion accident at Tokai-mura, neutron and photon skyshine doses were observed and reported at 1.5 -2 km away from the accident site, and furthermore, the measured skyshine radiation intensity followed the power excursion history [3].…”

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confidence: 96%

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Reactor radiation skyshine calculations with TRIPOLI-4 code for Baikal-1 experiments

Lee

2014

Progress in Nuclear Science and Technology

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Neutron and photon fluxes generated from the operation of fission reactors and fuel cycle facilities are normally well attenuated with the shielding and ceiling walls. However, skyshine dose rates were observed at 1.5 -2 km away from the JCO criticality accident site at Tokai-mura. In this study reactor neutron and photon skyshine calculations of Baikal-1 experiments have been performed with the TRIPOLI-4 Monte Carlo transport code. Baikal-1 experiments were carried out with the 300 kW RA research reactor. The 85 cm thick concrete shielding plug in the upper direction of the RA reactor was removed during the experiments. Various distances up to 1500 m from the reactor were considered for skyshine radiation measurements. To study the neutron and photon skyshine dose rates off the reactor with TRIPOLI-4 code, both photon and coupled neutron-photon calculations were performed so as to include primary photons, primary neutrons, and secondary photons contributions. TRIPOLI-4 perturbation calculations on the ground density and on the hydrogen concentration contained in the ground composition were also applied to study the groundshine.

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