DOS-Resistant Authentication with Client Puzzles

Aura, Tuomas; Nikander, Pekka; Leiwo, Jussipekka

doi:10.1007/3-540-44810-1_22

Cited by 179 publications

(136 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…We use this principle to develop a model for denial-of-service-resilient key agreement. The technique of [ANL00] is not sufficient to defend against the attack of Mao and Paterson [MP02]; our approach is.…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards Denial-of-Service-Resilient Key Agreement Protocols

Stebila

Ustaoğlu

2009

Information Security and Privacy

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Denial of service resilience is an important practical consideration for key agreement protocols in any hostile environment such as the Internet. There are well-known models that consider the security of key agreement protocols, but denial of service resilience is not considered as part of these models. Many protocols have been argued to be denial-of-service-resilient, only to be subsequently broken or shown ineffective.In this work we propose a formal definition of denial of service resilience, a model for secure authenticated key agreement, and show how security and denial of service resilience can be considered in a common framework, with a particular focus on client puzzles. The model accommodates a variety of techniques for achieving denial of service resilience, and we describe one such technique by exhibiting a denial-of-service-resilient secure authenticated key agreement protocol. Our approach addresses the correct integration of denial of service countermeasures with the key agreement protocol to prevent hijacking attacks that would otherwise render the countermeasures irrelevant.

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Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[1]), then, except with negligible probability, ch[2] was generated only be someone who knew both ρ and ch [1]. SinceB is a DoS-unexposed party, no DoSExpose(B) query could have been issued and since ρ is only ever used as an input to a random oracle, onlyB knows ρ.…”

Section: Denial Of Service Resilience Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Denial-of-Service-Resilient Key Agreement Protocols

Stebila

Ustaoğlu

2009

Information Security and Privacy

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“…For example, Meadows [43], Aura et al [9] and Dean and Stubblefield [22] explored an attack in which a large number of messages with bogus signatures to deplete an authentication server's CPU cycles. Another example is given by Crosby and Wallach [20], who demonstrated that carefully crafted inputs could degrade hash tables to linked lists, and thus force a web proxy to run at its worse-case performance.…”

Section: Denial-of-service Attacks and Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, it offers little incentive to the owners of Internet hosts to protect their computers from unwittingly joining the zombie fleet-given the negligible interference of the DDoS tools on the compromised machines that host them [18,24,25,35] on the one hand and the significant administrative overhead of malware defense on the other. Client puzzles [9,22,38] could lead to a potentially more active response to DoS. In this approach, a client solves a computational "puzzle" for requesting service before the server commits resources, thereby imposing a massive computational burden on adversaries bent on generating legitimate service requests to consume substantial server resources.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A multi-layer framework for puzzle-based denial-of-service defense

Reiter

2007

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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Client puzzles have been advocated as a promising countermeasure to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in recent years. However, how to operationalize this idea in network protocol stacks still has not been sufficiently studied. In this paper, we describe our research on a multi-layer puzzle-based DoS defense architecture, which embeds puzzle techniques into both end-to-end and IP-layer services. Specifically, our research results in two new puzzle techniques: puzzle auctions for end-to-end protection and congestion puzzles for IP-layer protection. We present the designs of these approaches and evaluations of their efficacy. We demonstrate that our techniques effectively mitigate DoS threats to IP, TCP and application protocols; maintain full interoperability with legacy systems; and support incremental deployment. We also provide a game theoretic analysis that sheds light on the potential to use client puzzles for incentive engineering: the costs of solving puzzles on an attackers' behalf could motivate computer owners to more aggressively cleanse their computers of malware, in turn hindering the attacker from capturing a large number of computers with which it can launch DoS attacks.

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“…Client puzzles are a proactive mechanism to defend against denial of service attacks. They have been proposed in the context of TCP [12,13,14,20,43,44], authentication protocols [7,26], and TLS [11].…”

Section: Denial-of-service Prevention Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%