Doping and cheating in contest-like situations

Kräkel, Matthias

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.003

Cited by 59 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 26 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…Prize structures can also be manipulated so the monitoring cost is kept low [5]. These models [6]–[12] suggest that eradicating doping would require changes in the external factors, such as increased dis-utility (including the chance of being detected and its consequences), decreased utility (reduced pay-off) or some combination of the two. In reality, it is unlikely that such change will be effectively implemented.…”

Section: Relevant Literature On Economics Of Dopingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Multi-Player Performance-Enhancing Drug Game

2013

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This paper extends classical work on economics of doping into a multi-player game setting. Apart from being among the first papers formally formulating and analysing a multi-player doping situation, we find interesting results related to different types of Nash-equilibria (NE). Based mainly on analytic results, we claim at least two different NE structures linked to the choice of prize functions. Linear prize functions provide NEs characterised by either everyone or nobody taking drugs, while non-linear prize functions lead to qualitatively different NEs with significantly more complex predictive characteristics.

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Section: Relevant Literature On Economics Of Dopingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Multi-Player Performance-Enhancing Drug Game

2013

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“…In the case of Wimbledon, for example, the individual match is indeed between just two players but the ultimate goal of each player is not to win only this particular match but to appear high in the world 1 Berentsen (2002), Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004), Haugen (2004), and Kräkel (2007). Some ideas developed in the present article were already present in Bird and Wagner (1997) but have not been formally investigated there.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Riding High - Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures

Strulik

2008

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. This article develops a socio-economic model that analyzes the doping decision of professional athletes. In their decision to use performance enhancing drugs athletes do not only evaluate the costs and benefits (in terms of potential rank improvement). They also take into account peer-group approval of using drugs. Peer-group approval is modelled as a lagged endogenous variable that depends on the share of drug using athletes in the history of a sport. This way, the model can explain multiple equilibria as "doping cultures". Besides the comparative statics of the equilibrium (how can a doping culture be eliminated?) the article also investigates how the doping decision is affected by standards set by the respective leader in a sport, e.g. Olympic qualification marks, and by the taste of victory, i.e. the disproportionate public veneration of winners. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…By using analytical models mainstream economics showed recently a growing interest on cheating behaviors generally related to situations in which individuals act illegally to improve their positions (Krakel 2007;Berentsen et al 2008). In agricultural economics some authors refer to cheating as the farmer opportunity to misrepresent the quantity of production Fulton, 2000, 2003), while in environmental studies as the violation of governmental regulations (Rege 2000;Garvie and Keeler 1994).…”

Section: Model Validity and Dockingmentioning

confidence: 98%

Opportunism by cheating and its effects on industry profitability. The CIOPS model

Biggiero

Sevi

2009

Comput Math Organ Theory

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CIOPS (Cognitive Inter-organizational Production System) is an agentbased model that integrates industry structural aspects and agents' cognitive characteristics. A demand-driven industry, whose profitability depends on the quality of suppliers' products, is represented by a three-stage vertically integrated industry. Four types of decision-making patterns are analyzed and confronted each other: from the simplest one (random choice) to the most complex one, which includes direct and indirect experience and reputation. They operate as selection devices supporting agents to select the best suppliers. Requiring agents' communication, indirect experience and reputation could be influenced by eventual opportunist behaviors. As the disturbing effect of falsity depends also on the size of decision and information space, the CIOPS model simulates different situations. Even though submitted to some restrictive assumptions, by testing five groups of hypotheses CIOPS model enables to fix many points that could be tested by empirical data and further developed by relaxing the assumptions. Results show that, especially in presence of reputation-based trust, cheating attitude severely damages industry profitability and the enlargement of information space dramatically strengthens the negative effects. Though indirect experience and reputation-based trust are powerful tools to improve industry profitability, when people cheat they dramatically reverses its effects. A sharp performance diversity is also evidenced between industry segments, because firms in the first tiers segment, who are also the suppliers of final producers, perform much better and more efficiently than final producers. Though industry size growth determines the negative url: www.knownetlab.it 192 L. Biggiero, E. Sevi effect of reducing performance, it produces the positive effect of shortening the time to reach the highest profitability and to stabilize it. Finally, it is also demonstrated that cheating half times determines almost the same negative impact of cheating always.

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Doping and cheating in contest-like situations

Cited by 59 publications

References 26 publications

The Multi-Player Performance-Enhancing Drug Game

The Multi-Player Performance-Enhancing Drug Game

Riding High - Success in Sports and the Rise of Doping Cultures

Opportunism by cheating and its effects on industry profitability. The CIOPS model

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