Doorkeepers and Gatecrashers: EU Enlargement and Negotiation Strategies

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple war of attrition bargaining game. Both players -the existing EU members and the applicants -benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analyzed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Europeanism: A Historical View

“…65 There is a residue of this in the implicit assumptions of EU enlargement, which treat non-EU European countries (accession candidates and EEA/EFTA members) not as members of a different 'Europe', but as adjuncts or 'members-in-waiting' of the full raft of current and eventual future European institutions. 66 Yet this monolithic logic has consistently been challenged in the ideological history of Europeanism, giving rise to counter-discourses of overlapping 'Europes' at different 'speeds' of integration, in the form of 'opt-outs' at the 'slower' end and 'enhanced cooperation' at the 'faster' end. 67 For interwar Europeanisms, the idea of 'one Europe' was superficially self-evident.…”

Turkey and the European Union

“…They prioritized deepening (Smith, 2003, p. 106) and were determined to minimize the costs of the operation by providing a limited financial package for the CEECs. 11 In this respect, Brücker et al (2004) present the accession negotiations as a simple 'war of attrition' bargaining game. Although, in the long term accession benefits both sides of the process, adopting the acquis is costly for the applicants, particularly in the short term.…”

Cooperation and Competition in Public-Sector Negotiations: A Laboratory Experiment

“…Many negotiations in the public and private sector are repetitive. Repeated negotiations are found in service contracting (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004), in public-sector reform and cutback management (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010), in international diplomacy, EU policy implementation or enlargement negotiations (Br€ ucker, Schr€ oder, & Weise, 2004), and in publicprivate partnerships when private companies and municipalities negotiate practical implementation in infrastructural projects (Osborne, 2000).…”