2017 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) 2017
DOI: 10.1109/spw.2017.40
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Don’t You Touch My Nuts: Information Hiding in Cyber Physical Systems

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Cited by 10 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Examples: i) modulation of actuator states [33]; ii) modulation of a setpoint in a control command; iii) modulation of ICS configuration data (and its backups) for long-term storage of secret data [113]; iv) modulation of control action states in the controller logic [114]; v) modulation of control signal and state measurements [115] randomization of an Android smartphone (here considered as a cyber-physical device due to its sensors and actuators) to overwrite it with a secret message; iii) an imaginable idea is to replace the randomized bits of the ShadowAuth CAN authentication message with encrypted covert data (cf. [116]); iv) one could potentially apply the idea of replacement of entries in a conditioner buffer from physical processes used in an RNG similarly as described by a work of Evtyushkin et al [117], where the buffer is first replaced by rseeds, followed by an entry that is replaced by the sender or not; v) modulation of high-resolution sensor values affected by random sensor-and/or process noise (c.f.…”
Section: Cps Steganography Sub-taxonomymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Examples: i) modulation of actuator states [33]; ii) modulation of a setpoint in a control command; iii) modulation of ICS configuration data (and its backups) for long-term storage of secret data [113]; iv) modulation of control action states in the controller logic [114]; v) modulation of control signal and state measurements [115] randomization of an Android smartphone (here considered as a cyber-physical device due to its sensors and actuators) to overwrite it with a secret message; iii) an imaginable idea is to replace the randomized bits of the ShadowAuth CAN authentication message with encrypted covert data (cf. [116]); iv) one could potentially apply the idea of replacement of entries in a conditioner buffer from physical processes used in an RNG similarly as described by a work of Evtyushkin et al [117], where the buffer is first replaced by rseeds, followed by an entry that is replaced by the sender or not; v) modulation of high-resolution sensor values affected by random sensor-and/or process noise (c.f.…”
Section: Cps Steganography Sub-taxonomymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, in filesystem steganography, the cover object might be a file, unused space in a partially allocated block, cluster distribution of an existing file [14], or an inode [7]. In cyber-physical systems (CPS) steganography, a value might be embedded into a sensor value [32], an actuator state or unused registers [34], or into the control logic of a PLC [15]. Hidden data might even be embedded into the number of cyber-physical events of some machine.…”
Section: Analysis Of Existing Steganography Domainsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(1) Reserved/Unused State/Value Modulation: The covert message is embedded by modulating reserved/unused states/values, e.g., 1) overwriting the IPv4 reserved field [12]; 2) modulation of unused registers in embedded CPS equipment [34]. (2) Random Modulation: A (pseudo-)random value or state is replaced with a secret message (that is also following a pseudorandom appearance), e.g., 1) replacing the pseudo-random content of a network header field with encrypted covert content; 2) encoding a secret message in the randomized selection of a starting player in an online chess game.…”
Section: En3 Elements/features Enumerationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1. Reserved/Unused State/Value Modulation: The covert message is embedded by modulating reserved/unused states/values, e.g., 1) overwriting the IPv4 reserved field [12]; 2) modulation of unused registers in embedded CPS equipment [34].…”
Section: En4 State/value Modulationmentioning
confidence: 99%