1985
DOI: 10.2307/1148892
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Don't Corner Mexico!

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Cited by 9 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…33 Mexican political scientist and diplomat Jorge Castañeda wrote at the time that Mexico's dual policy of opposing US military involvement and lending diplomatic cover to Marxist groups in Central America was therefore based "exclusively on self-interest." 34 Colombian foreign minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo similarly explained that Central American instability complicated his country's efforts to reorient its economic growth strategy toward the Caribbean coast, while Panamanian officials frequently commented that instability might jeopardize the Torrijos-Carter treaties that saw Panama win control of its interoceanic canal. 35 Moreover, political elites across the continent worried that US proxy intervention might evolve into a direct military invasion.…”
Section: Two Warsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…33 Mexican political scientist and diplomat Jorge Castañeda wrote at the time that Mexico's dual policy of opposing US military involvement and lending diplomatic cover to Marxist groups in Central America was therefore based "exclusively on self-interest." 34 Colombian foreign minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo similarly explained that Central American instability complicated his country's efforts to reorient its economic growth strategy toward the Caribbean coast, while Panamanian officials frequently commented that instability might jeopardize the Torrijos-Carter treaties that saw Panama win control of its interoceanic canal. 35 Moreover, political elites across the continent worried that US proxy intervention might evolve into a direct military invasion.…”
Section: Two Warsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Castañeda wrote in 1984, the Contadora process was "essentially pro-Sandinista," even when its representatives chastised the FSLN for imprisoning political opponents or shuttering dissident newspapers, and even though the draft treaties bound the revolutionary government to vague promises of democratization. 66 The Sandinista National Directorate reasoned that the gains from participating in Contadora-mitigating the intensity of US coercion-outweighed the costsbacktracking on its prior refusal to make concessions regarding the country's internal affairs. The FSLN's Department of International Relations (DRI) and Nicaragua's Foreign Ministry consciously exploited the North-South cleavages exposed by Reagan's heavy-handed approach to the region.…”
Section: The Death Of Contadora?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the United States obviously prefers the quieter position, it should not forget that such rhetoric serves a useful purpose in pacifying more radical elements on the domestic Mexican political scene, thereby also contributing to the US interest in preserving Mexican political stability (Castaneda, 1985;Cornelius, 1987). Mexico sees itself as a Latin American country which, ipso facto, has a better understanding of the region than does the United States.…”
Section: Relations With the United Statesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mexico began to provide the rebels with small amounts of money and political support. 67 The following spring witnessed a new set of circumstances: the United States was looking for a way to replace Somoza with a non-Sandinista; Venezuela's commitment to the FSLN was under question because of domestic politics; and the possibility was emerging that Cuba could become the dominant foreign influence in a FSLN government. Faced with these circumstances, Mexico decided to step in.…”
Section: The Sandinistas and A New Us Threat Since 1979mentioning
confidence: 99%