Why would incumbents undertake institutional reforms which constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. Risking exit from office, incumbents are argued to reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing it confounds two potential implications of electoral competitionpotential and certain electoral losseswhich yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has neglected so far: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross-country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis-incentivizes tenure reform.Electoral competition may thus be a double-edged sword for institutional reform.