Domestic Political Consequences of International Rivalry

Abstract

Given the conventional claim that external threats increase internal cohesion and government capacity, cross-country studies have examined how interstate conflict events influence domestic politics. This article reevaluates the in-group and out-group mechanisms by examining how international strategic rivalry, which indicates the presence of persistent external threats even in the absence of military conflict, affects domestic political competition. An alternative explanation suggests that the effect of external threats on political incentives of domestic actors differs between regime supporters and oppositions. We posit that the presence of international threats from rival states inflames domestic unrest and oppositions’ antiregime challenges, while making governments rely more on repressive tactics given resource constraints and a high level of domestic political intolerance. In addition, we propose that the domestic consequences of international rivalry are heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of political systems and the level of threat perception. Empirical tests reveal robust evidence for the hypotheses.

How do external territorial threats affect mass killing?

“…First, to the best of our knowledge, no robust evidence suggests that external threats increase cohesion and political stability at a country level, although there is group-level evidence from psychological research (Brewer, 1999). To the contrary, Bak, Rider & Chavez (2017) find that external threats from rival states make a country more likely to experience domestic unrest and state repression. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that territorial rivalry, explained in detail below, is associated with a greater level of political instability, violence, and state repression (see the Online supporting appendix for more information).…”

“…This is problematic since the absence of militarized confrontations does not necessarily indicate peaceful relationships, and many different levels of threat and hostility can underlie the absence of overt violence (Goertz, Diehl & Balas, 2016). A perception of external threat even in the absence of war can cause state insecurity and vulnerability and make domestic politics respond to external threats (Bak, Rider & Chavez, 2017). For example, Barnett (1995: 497) argues that ‘not only do wars and external threats generally act as important impetuses behind the state’s penetration and control over society but also they can build a sense of “we-ness” and develop a national identity’.…”

“…External territorial threats facilitate military mobilization and expand state scope (Gibler, 2012). In this process, governing elites seek to impose internal unity, silence the opposition, and extract resources from domestic audiences, all of which can instigate political resistance, particularly from domestic out-groups (Bak, Rider & Chavez, 2017; Uzonyi, 2018). In response to domestic challenges, elites can elicit public support by portraying out-groups as threatening enemies or accusing them of colluding with an external enemy.…”

“…Consistent with the studies on war and mass killing, we argue that territorial disputes, serious and salient to the public, can engender in-group/out-group dynamics at home in which ruling elites cast certain domestic groups as threatening enemies who may support or collude with the enemy (Midlarsky, 2005; Tir & Jasinski, 2008; Wright, 2014). Elites seek to impose internal unity, silence oppositional groups, and extract resources from domestic audiences, all of which may increase the likelihood of mass killing (Bak, Rider & Chavez, 2017; Uzonyi, 2018). Yet territorial threats alone cannot sufficiently explain why a state chooses mass killing over other alternative strategies, given the extremely high cost of mass killing.…”

External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes

“…Empirical evidence suggests that external threats lead to military intervention rather than military withdrawal. Recent cross-national studies demonstrate that sustained security threats from international rivalries (including territorial rivalries) or territorial disputes increase the risk of coups (Bak, Rider, and Chavez 2017;Florea 2018;Kim 2018aKim , 2018b. 4 Similarly, the risk of military coups, indeed, tends to be greater in countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Thailand, and Turkey where the military as an institution has greater political influence.…”