Domestic legitimacy politics and varieties of regionalism in East Asia

Abstract

What drives East Asian regionalism? The rise of China and the perceived decline in the influence of the United States have sparked debates about the future of the regional order, including the yet-unresolved question of whose leadership is likely to be more stable and accepted as legitimate by other regional actors. What is puzzling, however, is that persistent demands for the formation of a coherent and uniquely East Asian regional institution have come not from China or the US, as is the focus of existing studies, but rather Japan and South Korea. In this article, we propose an alternative framework that conceptualises the varieties of East Asian regionalism, emphasising the multiple pivots and variegated levels of politics involved in efforts toward regional cooperation. We find that competing proposals for East Asian regionalism since the 1990s are not determined by structural pressures or the convergence of interests but rather result from domestic legitimacy politics. Japanese and Korean leaders have, at different time periods, proposed their own alternative region-making initiatives appealing to domestically contested views on how best to seek autonomy from the region's Great Powers as a way to enhance their political standing domestically and regionally.

Rivalry and Overlap: Why Regional Economic Organizations Encroach on Security Organizations

“…On a deeper level, the absence of rivalries in REOs is an important factor to explain why they are willing and able to expand the organization’s scope into an already occupied policy domain. REOs that are rivalry-free include member-states that share common cooperative interests, might seek regional status, and understand the REO to be an expression of shared ideas and identity of a regional political community (Cho and Park 2014; Börzel 2016). This is conducive to scope expansion, in particular as the importance of cohesion increases as organizations deal with more contentious issues (Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013, 47).…”

Middle power, status-seeking and role conceptions: the cases of Indonesia and South Korea

“…With his economic success, Kim saw an opportunity to enhance Korea's international status by playing a more significant role as a regional player. To do so, he proposed the establishment of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) during the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meeting in 1998, which would further institutionalise the East Asia cooperation process (Cho and Park 2014). He also initiated the sunshine policy, through which South Korea's foreign policy applies a more accommodative strategy towards North Korea.…”

“…Roh's vision for South Korea's middle power roles within a greater regional focus in Northeast Asia was primarily driven by several factors, namely uncertainty about a rising China, a nuclearising North Korea, and a remilitarising Japan. Roh articulated the regional focus of his agenda by enhancing South Korea's middle power status as a regional balancer (gyunhyungja-ron) which aimed to make South Korea a hub of regional economy and politics in Northeast Asia (Cho and Park 2014). This vision required South Korea to strengthen its relations with China and seek greater autonomy from the US.…”

Regional Structures, Domestic Pressures and Postcolonial Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Asian Regionalism

“…2 For a good summary and analysis of this literature, see Cho and Park (2014). 3 For work that focuses in on the nexus of national security interests, American security engagement and regional dynamics, see Goh (2011), Hughes (2009, and Acharya and Goh (2007).…”

“…Likewise, politicians often engage through institutions in the face of stubborn domestic opposition. A recent thesis that cuts to the middle ground in explaining this behavior suggests, much as do the volumes under review to a substantial degree, that this behavioral phenomena stems from the need of leaders to pursue policy that legitimates their particular political positions and perspectives (Cho & Park, ). In this, leadership positions present as an amalgam set of preferences constructed by national inputs, the nature of the strategic manifesto for national engagement in the region, and structural constraints.…”