Domestic Institutions, Trade Disputes, and the Monitoring and Enforcement of International Law

Betz, Timm

doi:10.1080/03050629.2018.1407319

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…The former system provides politicians with incentives to pursue narrowly targeted policies which cater to particularistic interests. However, Betz (2018) shows that reciprocal trade agreements could lead exporters to lobby for the reduction or elimination of trade barriers at home in exchange for enhanced market access abroad. This influence renders the effect of majoritarian political institutions on the level of trade protection indeterminant.…”

Section: Domestic Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: trade wars past and present: causes, dynamics and consequences

Zeng¹,

Liang²

2022

Research Handbook on Trade Wars

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Section: Domestic Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: trade wars past and present: causes, dynamics and consequences

Zeng¹,

Liang²

2022

Research Handbook on Trade Wars

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“…See also Block 1977;Kindleberger 1986;Eichengreen 2008;Eichengreen and Irwin 2010;and Roberts 2013. 11. In this sense the literature echoes a broader bias in the literature on trade politics toward protectionist demands by import-competing firms (Rodrik 1995;Betz 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries

Betz¹,

Kerner²

2016

Int Org

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Why and when do developing countries file trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Although financial conditions have long been considered an important driver of trade policy, they have been largely absent from the literature on trade disputes. We argue that developing country governments bring more trade dispute to the WTO when overvalued real exchange rates put exporters at a competitive disadvantage. This dynamic is most prevalent in countries where large foreign currency debt burdens discourage nominal currency devaluations that would otherwise serve exporters’ interests. Our findings provide an explanation for differences in dispute participation rates among developing countries, and also suggest a new link between exchange rate regimes and trade policy.

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“…Although we are aware of many published papers that use PML to address the problem of separation (e.g., Barrilleaux and Rainey, 2014;Leeman and Mares, 2014;Bell and Miller, 2015;Vining et al, 2015), and one published paper (Chacha and Powell, 2017) and one unpublished paper (Kaplow and Gartzke, 2015) that use PML to address the related problem of rare events (King and Zeng, 2001), we are aware of no published study in political science using PML for bias reduction specifically in small samples in logit models. We are aware of one published paper using PML for bias reduction: Betz (2018) However, if the score function s is decreasing and curved in the area around b true j so that s ′′ j = ∂ 2 s(y, b)/∂ 2 b j . 0 (see Figure 1), then a high miss s(y, b true ) .…”

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confidence: 99%

Estimating logit models with small samples

Rainey

McCaskey²

2021

PSRM

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In small samples, maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of logit model coefficients have substantial bias away from zero. As a solution, we remind political scientists of Firth's (1993, Biometrika, 80, 27–38) penalized maximum likelihood (PML) estimator. Prior research has described and used PML, especially in the context of separation, but its small sample properties remain under-appreciated. The PML estimator eliminates most of the bias and, perhaps more importantly, greatly reduces the variance of the usual ML estimator. Thus, researchers do not face a bias-variance tradeoff when choosing between the ML and PML estimators—the PML estimator has a smaller bias and a smaller variance. We use Monte Carlo simulations and a re-analysis of George and Epstein (1992, American Political Science Review, 86, 323–337) to show that the PML estimator offers a substantial improvement in small samples (e.g., 50 observations) and noticeable improvement even in larger samples (e.g., 1000 observations).

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Domestic Institutions, Trade Disputes, and the Monitoring and Enforcement of International Law

Cited by 8 publications

References 44 publications

Introduction: trade wars past and present: causes, dynamics and consequences

Introduction: trade wars past and present: causes, dynamics and consequences

Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries

Estimating logit models with small samples

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