Dollar Liquidity, Financial Vulnerability and Monetary Sovereignty

Abstract

Periods of dollar‐led global monetary tightening generate negative effects in many lower‐ and middle‐income countries. The tightening cycle which commenced in early 2022 has exacerbated the financial dislocation experienced by countries including Zambia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. How can policy makers protect their economies from such external shocks and foster a stable developmental environment? Some recent contributions argue that the capacity of countries to insulate domestic policy from global financial conditions depends upon ‘monetary sovereignty’. This contribution argues that this misrepresents the constraints to macroeconomic policy and development strategy. Monetary sovereignty, if narrowly defined, is necessary but not sufficient for domestic policy autonomy. Stronger definitions impose unrealistic requirements on debt denomination and exchange rate regimes. The authors argue that, outside of currency unions, the main policy constraints for developing countries are limited domestic productive capacity and integration into global trade and financial networks rather than monetary arrangements. The discussion is illustrated with an empirical examination of three recent episodes of global illiquidity and/or policy tightening: the 2013 taper tantrum, the March 2020 liquidity shock and the 2022 dollar tightening cycle. The authors find evidence that monetary sovereignty does not insulate a country from episodes of dollar illiquidity. While ‘fundamentals’ such as current account deficits and foreign exchange reserves provide limited power in identifying vulnerability, measures of financial depth and activity do appear related to vulnerability.