Doing Well and Doing Good?

Gilens, Martin; Thal, Adam

doi:10.1093/poq/nfy020

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Some evidence from survey research on policy preferences suggests that some affluent Democratic voters do express support for enhanced welfare policy spending (Gilens and Thal 2018) and tax-and-spend redistribution (Franko, Tolbert, and Witko 2013), Democratic donors do express economically redistributive tax-and-spend preferences (Broockman and Malhotra 2020), and high-income voters who work in (big metropolitan area) knowledge-economy sectors 30 —who lean Democratic, as this paper showed—do support various forms of government social insurance spending (Ansell and Gingrich 2021). Overall, this evidence suggests that more-affluent Democratic voters may support some forms of economic redistribution.…”

Section: Effects Of the Increasingly Democratic Affluent On The Polit...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution

Zacher¹

2023

Perspect. polit.

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Affluent Americans used to vote for Republican politicians. Now they vote for Democrats. In this paper, I show detailed evidence for this decades-in-the-making trend and argue that it has important consequences for the U.S. politics of economic inequality and redistribution. Beginning in the 1990s, the Democratic Party started winning increasing shares of rich, upper-middle income, high-income occupation, and stock-owning voters. This appears true across voters of all races and ethnicities, is concentrated among (but not exclusive to) college-educated voters, and is only true among voters living in larger metropolitan areas. In the 2010s, Democratic candidates’ electoral appeal among affluent voters reached above-majority levels. I echo other scholars in maintaining that this trend is partially driven by the increasingly “culturally liberal” views of educated voters and party elite polarization on those issues, but I additionally argue that the evolution and stasis of the parties’ respective economic policy agendas has also been a necessary condition for the changing behavior of affluent voters. This reversal of an American politics truism means that the Democratic Party’s attempts to cohere around an economically redistributive policy agenda in an era of rising inequality face real barriers.

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Section: Effects Of the Increasingly Democratic Affluent On The Polit...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution

Zacher¹

2023

Perspect. polit.

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“…Although Mummolo and Peterson (2019) showed that people are not likely to adjust their attitudes in line with researchers’ expectations across different research contexts, we use a behavioral measure that is costly for respondents and thus potentially less subject to social desirability bias (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). For similar reasons, scholars have adopted various economic games in their survey and laboratory experiments to scrutinize whether a wide range of other-regarding behaviors align with attitudes toward policies aimed at improving the well-being of others in need (for a detailed discussion, see Gilens and Thal 2018). However, analyzing these behaviors toward asylum seekers and refugees compared with ethnic or religious minorities is limited.…”

Section: Theoretical Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Other-Regarding Behaviors and Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers

Sonmez

Iacono

2022

Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

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Previous studies predominantly examined self-reported attitudes toward economic migrants and refugees along with different types of public concerns. Few of these studies used behavioral measures to analyze how asylum seeker inflows may sway public preferences toward them. However, the literature remains largely silent on the issue as to how correcting misperceptions of asylum seeker inflows may improve a host population’s support for them. The authors’ research addresses this gap, using a lab experiment to examine how providing factual information on asylum seeker inflows changes other-regarding behaviors and attitudes of a host population toward asylum seekers, depending on people’s political leanings. Specifically, the authors examine whether factual information provided by a nonpartisan source may ease or backfire giving behaviors and unwelcoming attitudes toward asylum seekers through the moderation of partisanship. The findings suggest that providing accurate information about the number of asylum seekers counteracts low-level giving behaviors and unwelcoming attitudes of right-wing-leaning citizens.

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“…Other theories assume that for many people political activity is not instrumentally selfish, but motivated by social preferences or sociotropic goals (Fowler & Kam, 2007;Hamlin & Jennings, 2011;Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981). For instance, the mere act of giving might create a "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1995).…”

Section: How Will People Decide For Others?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Or, people might be motivated to be seen by themselves or others as making the ethical choice (Feddersen et al, 2009). Another possibility-which is our focus-is that people are motivated to be instrumentally beneficial, meaning they care whether their choices actually help others (Dawes et al, 2015;Del Ponte et al, 2021;Edlin et al, 2007;Fowler & Kam, 2007). If citizens care about how political and economic decisions affect others, their calculus changes (Bolsen et al, 2014;Edlin et al, 2007).…”

Section: How Will People Decide For Others?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If citizens care about how political and economic decisions affect others, their calculus changes (Bolsen et al, 2014;Edlin et al, 2007). Studies find that social preferences predict voting (Fowler, 2006), political activity (Dawes et al, 2015), helping or spiting political parties (Del Ponte et al, 2021), and supporting social welfare programs (Gilens & Thal, 2018). Further, people engage in more disaster preparedness when they are concerned about their community, not just themselves (Kim & Kang, 2010).…”

Section: How Will People Decide For Others?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

2021

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Disaster responses are political. But can citizens make useful disaster decisions? Potential obstacles are that such decisions are complex, involve public goods, and often affect other people. Theories of political decision-making disagree on whether these problems can be overcome. We used experimental economic games that simulate disaster to test whether people are willing and able to prevent disasters for others. Groups of players face a complex task in which options that might help vary in their riskiness. Importantly, although all options are reasonable, which option is most useful depends on the experimental condition. We find that players will pay to help, can identify which option is most useful across experimental conditions, and will pay to learn how best to help. Thus, players were able to make useful and costly decisions to prevent others from experiencing disaster. This suggests that, in at least some situations, citizens may be able to make good disaster decisions.

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Doing Well and Doing Good?

Cited by 22 publications

References 29 publications

Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution

Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution

Other-Regarding Behaviors and Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

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