Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict

Abstract

Humanitarian assistance is intended to ameliorate the human costs of war by providing relief to vulnerable populations. Yet, the introduction of aid resources into conflict zones may influence subsequent violence patterns and expose intended recipients to new risks. Herein, we investigate the potential negative externalities associated with humanitarian aid. We argue that aid can create incentives for armed actors to intentionally target civilians for violence. Aid incentivizes rebel violence by providing opportunities for looting and presenting challenges to rebel authority. It potentially incentivizes state violence where it augments rebel capabilities or provides rebels a resource base. We evaluate both arguments using spatially disaggregated data on aid and conflict violence for a sample of nearly two-dozen post-Cold War African countries. The results of multiple statistical analyses provide strong support for the argument that humanitarian aid is associated with increased rebel violence but less support for the relationship between aid and state violence. Acknowledgements: We wish to thank Christopher Fariss, Idean Salehyan, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. We thank Emily Molfino for her very helpful research assistance.

Contemporary Gifts: Solidarity, Compassion, Equality, Sacrifice, and Reciprocity from an NGO Perspective

“…The lack of satisfaction and effectiveness at a macro level can be explained by taking into consideration the negative externalities of the micro-level aid relations (Wood and Sullivan 2015). If decisions of the recipient (government or NGO) are guided by its own (individual or organizational) profit-maximizing function and not necessarily by that of the entire society (nation), certain costs shall be paid by the "whole."…”

The Hearts and Minds in Conflict and Peace

“…Instead of saying that insurgents become more powerful through looting, as most studies propose (e.g. Wood and Sullivan, 2015), this chapter suggests that corruption and the commensal relationship among local leaders, contractors, and insurgents can also explain the violence-inducing effect of aid in the case of Iraq. While the US military directly paid the Sunni sheikhs to buy down violence, local leaders contracted violence out to (foreign) fighters to induce more attacks.…”

“…Its effectiveness, however, has been a subject of debate among scholars and policy makers alike. While some empirical studies have shown that aid is effective in deterring or ending violent conflicts (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014;Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a;de Ree and Nillesen, 2009;Savun and Tirone, 2012), some have found it ineffective or, in some cases, counterproductive (Crost, Felter, and Johnston, 2014;Dube and Naidu, 2015;Narang, 2014;Narang, 2015;Nunn and Qian, 2014;Sollenberg, 2012;Wood and Sullivan, 2015).…”

“…Similar arguments have been put forth by more recent studies. For example, Wood and Sullivan (2015) state that aid is frequently stolen or looted en route by armed groups. Nunn and Qian (2014) point out that donors may have difficulty excluding local armed groups from benefiting from food aid if their members are malnourished and hence qualified to receive it.…”

“…A large body of research emphasizes that aid may strengthen an armed group (Dube and Naidu, 2015;Nunn and Qian, 2014;Wood and Sullivan, 2015). Presenting a slightly different argument using the bargaining framework, Narang (2014) considers that aid may encourage a group to renegotiate.…”