Doing Gender

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to advance a new understanding of gender as a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction. To do so entails a critical assessment of existing perspectives on sex and gender and the introduction of important distinctions among sex, sex category, and gender. We argue that recognition of the analytical independence of these concepts is essential for understanding the interactional work involved in being a gendered person in society. The thrust of our remarks is toward theoretical reconceptualization, but we consider fruitful directions for empirical research that are indicated by our formulation.

Gender differences in narcissism: A meta-analytic review.

“…The biosocial model (see Wood & Eagly, 2002) has been described as an alternative to, and in some regards a blend of, two other theoretical traditions often used to explain gender differences: (a) the essentialist perspective on gender (exemplified by evolutionary psychology; e.g., Buss & Schmitt, 2011;Pérusse, 1993)-which emphasizes men's evolved dispositions to participate in dominance contests and to control women's sexuality, along with women's evolved dispositions to select mates who provide more resources; cf. Eastwick & Finkel, 2008), and (b) the social constructionist perspective on gender (exemplified in sociology and anthropology; see Geertz, 1974;Mead, 1963;West & Zimmerman, 1987-which emphasizes gender differences as a local cultural phenomenon only, similar to the choice of clothing or hairstyles). The biosocial model offers a constellation of explanations for gender differences that is distinct from its predecessor theories.…”

Masculinities and femininities as communities of practice

“…Although clearly bodily form is an extremely important marker of potential membership of such a community of practice (it is by virtue of their genital configuration that baby girls and boys are initially recognised as legitimate peripheral participants in the community of females and males, respectively), other, at first sight more trivial, indications can be very important in particular situations and contexts. This would appear to be because gender dimorphism is so fundamental to most human societies that we feel uncomfortable if we are unsure if a person we encounter belongs to the loose configuration of male communities of practice or to its female counterpart (Donath, 1999;O'Brien, 1999;West & Zimmerman, 1987). In most encounters, we are not in a position to inspect someone's genitals, so we rely on other markers of maleness and femaleness and use these to ascribe participation in a masculine or feminine community of practice; primary and secondary sexual characteristics are used as reified objects that mark membership of (usually) one or other of these communities.…”

Tomboys and girly-girls: embodied femininities in primary schools

“…It is well established that the body and how it is produced is central to identity, in children as well as in adults (Butler, 1993;Connell, 2002;Davies, 2003;Foucault, 1984;Frank, 1991;Gatens, 1992Gatens, , 1996Grosz, 1994Grosz, , 1999Jackson, 2006;Kelly, Pomerantz, & Currie, 2005;Mauss, 1973Mauss, /1935Renold, 2005;Satina & Hultgren, 2001;Shilling, C., 1993Shilling, C., , 2005West & Zimmerman, 1987;Young, 2005). At the same time, however, children's embodiment in the schooling context has been relatively ignored (Paechter, 2006c), with the majority of researchers paying little attention to children's bodies and how they understand and use them.…”