Background: Having lived for several centuries in areas with a polyethnic population, Croatian Rusyns and Ukrainians have repeatedly found themselves on the path of interethnic confrontation between Serbs and Croats. The events of the Serbo-Croatian War (1991–1995) were one of the peak moments of such confrontations in the Yugoslav state. The Serbo-Croatian War is the most favorite topic of Croatian historiography of the entire period of independence. However, the question about the state of the Croatian national minorities during the war was covered only by few researchers. Local researchers actually don't raise the issue of collaborationism in the 1990s. Purpose: to assess the extent of collaboration of Rusyns and Ukrainians with self proclaimed Serbian Krajina, to find out the nature, motives and causes of this phenomenon. Results: The Serbo-Croatian War of 1991–1995 was caused by the disintegration of the SFRY, Croatia's desire to secede from the Federation, and the presence of a large Serb minority on its territory that did not share that desire. Because of military campaigns at the end of 1991, Croatian Serbs completely sepa-rated from Croatia, taking a quarter of its territory under control, and proclaimed the formation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It occupied the territory where a large part of the non-Serb population lived. In particular, most of the descendants of immigrants from Ukrainian lands were in a city Vukovar, villages Petrovci and Mikluševci (Eastern Slavonia). The non-Serb population of Serbian Krajina (including Rusyns and Ukrainians) found itself on the path of a “Serbisation” policy of the occupied territories. So an occu-pation regime was established for Rusyns and Ukrainians of this region. Destruction, looting, rape, beatings, damage to the Greek Catholic Churches, “ethnic cleansing”, bru-tal killings of particular families – this is the list of actions of the new government. Territorial Defense headquarters were organized in each settlement occupied by the YPA and insurgent Serbs, which included individual Rusyns and Ukrainians who sympathized with official Belgrade. Due to active collaboration with Serbs, some Rusyns from Mikluševci lived well under Serbian authority. They opened shops, hotels, businesses. Individual Rusyns from Mikluševci, at the behest of local Serbs, tortured fellow villagers and helped to deport them. According to the expelled locals, the hardest thing for them was not to ac-cept the Serbian occupation itself, but the betrayal of their compatriots. There was also a forced collaborationism. Due to the compact location of Ukraini-ans in the border areas between Serbia and Croatia, during the war a large number of Ukrainian men were mobilized to the YPA or the Croatian forces, depending on the place of residence. In 1995, Croatia regained considerable territory during its armed operations. The return of Eastern Slavonia, where most Rusyns and Ukrainians lived, was to be done gradually and under the control of the UN Transitional Administration. During the process of reintegration a complex process of return of refugees and exiles, psychological normalization of social relations, and adaptation of people to new circumstances, has continued. After the reintegration of the Danube region, Croatia has failed to establish an effective mechanism for punishing war criminals. The so-called “Mikluševci’s process” gained considerable resonance. The case was directed against those who deported 98 and killed four people from Mikluševci in the spring of 1992 (all the victims were Rusyns). The investigation was constantly delayed, and the number of defendants decreased due to the deaths of suspects or lack of evidence. At the announcement of the sentence, only three ethnic Rusyns were present (other convicted had fled to Serbia and were inaccessible to the Croatian judiciary). So it turned out that only Rusyns were actually convicted for the war crime of genocide against the Rusyns. Thus, during the Croatian-Serbian war, the policy of the so-called Serbian Krajina, aimed at implementing the “Greater Serbia” plan, left Ukrainians no choice as to whom to support. However, even under such conditions, there were cases of collaboration between the Rusyn-Ukrainian diaspora and the Serbian occupation administration. If we omit forced collaborationism (mobilization into the ranks of the Serbian armed forces), then voluntary cooperation had various reasons: the desire to regain power lost as a result of the 1991 elections; nostalgia for socialist Yugoslavia and stability; as a means of resolving domestic conflicts and settling accounts with neighbors. Voluntary collaborationism among the inhabitants of Mikluševci and Petrovtsi did not become widespread. It was much less common among Ukrainians than among Rusyns – but this can also be explained by the much larger number of the Rusyns in the region. After the reintegration of the Danube, Croatia did not prosecute anyone for collaborationism, but mostly Ruthenians were convicted for “genocide” and “crimes against humanity”. However, this rather indicates the imperfection of the Croatian judiciary. Key words: Croatia, Rusyns, Ukrainians, Serbs, collaborationism, terror, Serbo-Croatian war. Biki, Đ., 2001. 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