Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis

Abstract

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period , this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.

Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in an International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission

“…40 Our findings also have several implications for the broader literature on foreign aid and international organizations. The majority of previous studies on vote influence in international organizations focus on how states may pursue their national security interests in international organizations (Alesina and Weder 2002;Lai and Morey 2006;Kuziemko and Werker 2006;Dreher et al 2008Dreher et al , 2009). In addition, prior research on aid and voting behavior in international organizations has examined international organizations that have multiple policy domains, such as the United Nations, and it has tended to concentrate on American foreign policy behavior and only secondarily considered other aid donors.…”

What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China

“…Quantitative studies on the influence of US aid disbursements and UNGA voting corroborate this mechanism: increased levels of development assistance and the provision of aid (general budget support, grants) indeed buys votes in the UNGA (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008;Wang 1999). 9 In addition, trade dependence increases the responsiveness to external demands, including unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and other economic benefits, and causes the economically weaker states to accommodate the foreign policy interests of the more powerful one (Dreher , Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008;Keohane and Nye 1977).…”

“…Politically like-minded countries may vote the same as China due to domestic interests. Empirical studies on voting behavior in the UNGA demonstrate that democratic governments are more inclined to vote with the US and other G7 countries because of shared principles (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008;Voeten 2000). 7 Taking the reverse of this argument, it can be assumed that countries characterized by nondemocratic…”

“…9 In addition, trade dependence increases the responsiveness to external demands, including unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and other economic benefits, and causes the economically weaker states to accommodate the foreign policy interests of the more powerful one (Dreher , Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008;Keohane and Nye 1977).…”

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

“…Likewise, a diplomat from a smaller EU member state said: "there was no like, big brother, absolutely not on our part, if other EU delegations, I never witnessed it, certainly not overtly. You might be disappointed if some bilateral aid partner opposed you on a certain issue, you might be disappointed but that's where it ends" (Anonymous Interviewee 105 2011; see also Kegley and Hook 1991;Wang 1999;Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008).…”