Does thought imply ought?

Bykvist, Krister; Hattiangadi, Anandi

doi:10.1093/analys/67.4.277

Cited by 66 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Other norms on belief – such as norms governing rational belief – are then explicable in terms on this primitive norm . Despite some initial appeal however, this strategy for understanding the norm on belief has been widely criticised, most influentially by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (). McHugh takes up and develops these criticisms.…”

Section: Problems For the Prescriptive Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh

Greenberg

Cowie

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh's more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.

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Section: Problems For the Prescriptive Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh

Greenberg

Cowie

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…Even if the supposed requirement to believe truths was restricted in some way, in order to avoid this problem, further problems arise when we consider propositions whose truth-value can be changed by our believing them, as with so-called 'blindspot' propositions, and selffulfilling and self-falsifying beliefs. In certain such cases, a requirement to believe what's true is unsatisfiable (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007;McHugh 2012). Fortunately, prescriptive norms can be merely permissive.…”

Section: Second Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

VIII-Fitting Belief

McHugh

2014

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.

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“…For proponents of the normative interpretation, see N. Shah (2003), N. Shah and D. Velleman (2005), R. Wedgwood (2002), P. Boghossian (2003), among others. For discussion of the correct form of the truth norm, see K. Bykvist and A. Hattiangadi (2007), K. Glüer and Å. Wikforss (2009), among others. 2 See D. Velleman (2000) and A.…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification

Steglich‐Petersen¹

2013

The Aim of Belief

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A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we focus on the relevant sense of 'justification', it isn't in fact possible for a belief to be at once justified and false. To this end, I consider and reject three popular intuitions speaking in favor of the possibility of justified false beliefs, and show that a factive account of epistemic justification is less detrimental to our normal belief forming practices than often supposed.

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Does thought imply ought?

Cited by 66 publications

References 7 publications

Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh

Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh

VIII-Fitting Belief

Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification

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