Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-b18

Abstract

In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.

How Aristotle Changes Anaxagoras’s Mind

“…DA 1.4, 407b34-408a1; DA 1.4, 408a32-33; DA 1.4, 409a16-17; DA 1.5, 411a29. 33 On Aristotle's conception of soul as an unmoved mover, see Menn (2002) and Carter (2018). that Anaxagoras's (M1), that mind is not mixed with other bodily things, can be reconciled with (M2), that it knew all things.…”

La crítica de Aristóteles al automovimiento del alma en DA I

“…He also suggests that she engages in some kind of movement-or he at least employs loose vocabulary in that sense-when referring to the effect that the sensible object has on her (see 406b10, 416b33, 418a31, 419a10 and 420a3), or in the much-discussed passages in which he refers to the soul's own affections (403a3). On this last point, see Carter (2018).…”

“…This situation has changed in recent years. While it is true that there have been some concrete examples of valuing book I of De Anima, 3 it is only with the monographic studies of Sánchez Castro (2016) and Carter (2019) that an attempt has been made to explain the value of this dialectical procedure for the rest of the philosophical project that Aristotle carries out in his exploration of the soul. However, a clarification is necessary.…”