Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?

An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option

“…Finally, we examine the framing effect under the AM. Thus, through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in decreasing the over-extraction of the CPR even with a larger number of observations with respect to [17]. Moreover, our results show that there is neither an ordering effect nor a framing effect.…”

“…We consider the 2-player CPR game. The CPR model is very similar to those of [17,20]. Let us consider the CPR model in [20].…”

“…Moreover, ref. [17] documented that the AM is also Pareto-improving in the case of a CPR game. The AM can be thought of as a way to promote cooperation between players by introducing an agreement on a collective sanction in case of disapproval.…”

“…Unlike the existing literature, we test the robustness of the Nash threat in a two-player CPR game. First, we extend the dataset to confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat observed in [17]. We examine in detail the reason that the Nash threat as the disapproval benchmark reduces CPR over-extraction to understand how subjects behave under the threat of Nash extraction.…”

“…The introduction of the Nash threat in the CPR game changes the structure of the game by promoting individual and group extraction levels below the Nash extraction level [17]. Ref.…”