2004
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.615281
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Does Soft Dollar Brokerage Benefit Portfolio Investors: Agency Problem or Solution?

Abstract: With soft dollar brokerage, institutional portfolio managers pay brokers "premium" commission rates in exchange for rebates they use to buy third-party research. One hypothesis views this practice as a reflection of the agency problem in delegated portfolio management; another views it as a contractual solution to the agency problem that aligns the incentives of investors, managers, and brokers where direct monitoring mechanisms are inadequate. Using a database of institutional money managers, we find that pre… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…This agency cost argument has been made relative to soft dollars byBerkowitz and Logue (1987) andLogue (1991). On the other hand,Johnsen (1994) andHoran and Johnsen (2004) argue that soft dollars may ameliorate agency cost issues.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This agency cost argument has been made relative to soft dollars byBerkowitz and Logue (1987) andLogue (1991). On the other hand,Johnsen (1994) andHoran and Johnsen (2004) argue that soft dollars may ameliorate agency cost issues.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%