We review the experimental evidence on risk aversion in controlled laboratory settings. We review the strengths and weaknesses of alternative elicitation procedures, the strengths and weaknesses of alternative estimation procedures, and finally the effect of controlling for risk attitudes on inferences in experiments.Attitudes to risk are one of the primitives of economics. Individual preferences over risky prospects are taken as given and subjective in all standard economic theory. Turning to the characterization of risk in applied work, however, one observes many restrictive assumptions being used. In many cases individuals are simply assumed to be risk neutral; 1 or perhaps to have the same constant absolute or relative aversion to risk.2 Assumptions buy tractability, of course, but at a cost. How plausible are the restrictive assumptions about risk attitudes that are popularly used? If they are not plausible, perhaps there is some way in which one can characterize the distribution of risk attitudes so that it can be used to analyze the implications of relaxing these assumptions. If so, such characterizations will condition inferences about choice behavior under uncertainty, bidding in auctions, and behavior in games.
Risk Aversion in ExperimentsResearch in Experimental Economics, Volume 12, Copyright r 2008 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0193-2306/doi:10.1016/S0193-2306(08)00003-3
41We examine the design of experimental procedures that can be used to estimate risk attitudes of individuals. We also investigate how the data generated by these procedures should be analyzed. We focus on procedures that allow ''direct'' estimation of risk preferences by eliciting choices in noninteractive settings, since we want to minimize the role of auxiliary or joint hypotheses about Nash Equilibrium (NE) behavior in games. It is important to try to get estimates that are independent of such joint assumptions, in order that the characterizations that emerge can be used to provide tighter tests of those joint assumptions.3 Nevertheless, we also include designs that rely on subjects recognizing a dominant strategy response in a game against the experimenter, although we will note settings in which the presumption that subjects actually use these might be suspect. 4 In Section 1 we consider the major procedures used to elicit risk attitudes. In Section 2 we review the alternative ways in which risk attitudes have been estimated from observed behavior using these procedures. In Section 3 we examine the manner in which measures of risk attitudes are used to draw inferences about lab behavior. Section 4 offers some thoughts on several open and closed issues, and Section 5 draws some grand conclusions.Our review is intended to complement the review by Cox and Sadiraj (2008) of theoretical issues in the use of concepts of risk aversion in experiments, as well as the review by Wilcox (2008a) of econometric issues involved in identifying risk attitudes when there is ...