Does Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a drive to strengthen existing public accountability arrangements and to design new ones. This prompts the question whether accountability arrangements actually work. In the existing literature, both accountability ‘deficits’ and ‘overloads’ are alleged to exist. However, owing to the lack of a cogent yardstick, the debate tends to be impressionistic and event‐driven. In this article we develop an instrument for systematically assessing public accountability arrangements, drawing on three different normative perspectives. In the democratic perspective, accountability arrangements should effectively link government actions to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’. In the constitutional perspective, it is essential that accountability arrangements prevent or uncover abuses of public authority. In the learning perspective, accountability is a tool to make governments effective in delivering on their promises. We demonstrate the use of our multicriteria assessment tool in an analysis of a new accountability arrangement: the boards of oversight of agencies.

The impact of co-production on frontline accountability: the case of the conciliation service

“…In governance, there may be changing roles depending on the project or the process of the service at hand. In these complex arrangements, the 'accountors' and the 'accountees' might not be as clearly defined as they are in the ideal models of governance (Bovens et al, 2008;Klijn and Koppenjaan, 2004;Laegreid and Mattei, 2013).…”

Re-locating accountability through technology

“…This practice typically involves an accountor and an accountee (Bovens et al, 2014;Chan, 1999;Mulgan, 2000;Neyland and Woolgar, 2002;Parker and Gould, 1999;Roberts and Scapens, 1985;Yakel, 2001) and is accompanied by evaluation of accountor's practices against certain standards or criteria (Bovens, 2010;Chan, 1999;Klenk and Pieper, 2012). These can be legal standards that officials need to meet, such as the constitution and the law (Bovens et al, 2008), procedural standards that prescribe how public processes need to be performed and performance requirements that identify outputs and outcomes (Gendron et al, 2001;Jos and Tompkins, 2004;Parker and Gould, 1999;Ryan and Walsh, 2004;Yang and Rho, 2007).…”

“…Specifically, external accountability, as it has come to be known, is defined as a relationship between an accountor and any party or stakeholder (such as government and community) external to but interested in the action that is being accounted and in its outcomes (Ahrens, 1996;Barberis, 1998;Bovens et al, 2008;Neyland and Woolgar, 2002;Parker and Gould, 1999). Seen from this viewpoint, external accountability 'enacts intersubjectivity' (Shearer, 2002 p. 545), fosters, ideally, dialogue and trust, involves reciprocity and renders the accountor object of critique and of approval or disapproval by others (Mulgan, 2000;Roberts, 2001;Shearer, 2002;Willmott, 1996).…”

Symposium introduction‐Climate change, governance and environmental services: Institutional perspectives, issues and challenges

“…The answers, while inevitably varying, will comprise some combination of the instrumental and the natural, with reference to different forms and purposes of accountability, including arguments about whether responsible conduct is instinctive or needs to be solicited (Friedrich, 1935(Friedrich, , 1940Finer, 1936Finer, , 1941. In essence, whatever the reasoning and whatever the sector or system, the broad interrelated aims should be to ensure public control, safeguard against the abuse of power, and foster effective governance with positive outcomes for society (Bovens et al, 2008;CO, 2007). These aims are clearly applicable to and beyond the ways in which institutions, as deft instruments or living entities, respond to climate change and its consequences.…”

“…(Bovens et al, 2008). The answers, while inevitably varying, will comprise some combination of the instrumental and the natural, with reference to different forms and purposes of accountability, including arguments about whether responsible conduct is instinctive or needs to be solicited (Friedrich, 1935(Friedrich, , 1940Finer, 1936Finer, , 1941.…”