Does Practice Make the Perfect Liar? The Effect of Rehearsal and Increased Cognitive Load on Cues to Deception

Abstract

Recent studies have explored ways to increase cognitive load in liars to identify cues to deception. This study used a driving simulator as a load-inducing technique to explore differences between truth-tellers and liars during an investigative interview scenario and also investigated the effect of rehearsing lies in this context. Deception affected driving performance. Truthtellers drove more slowly compared with their own baseline, whereas unrehearsed liars sped up. There was no difference in speed between truth-tellers and rehearsed liars. In addition, truth-tellers had significantly faster reaction times compared with their own baseline, than both rehearsed and unrehearsed liars. During the interviews, truth-tellers provided significantly more visual and auditory details and mentioned significantly fewer cognitive operations than liars. The findings add to the body of literature exploring the optimal relationship between cognitive load and secondary task performance to identify cues to deception. Copyright

Lie Detection Using fNIRS Monitoring of Inhibition-Related Brain Regions Discriminates Infrequent but not Frequent Liars

“…Deception is a cognitive process defined as intentionally suppressing the truth and producing false responses to obtain rewards or to avoid punishments (Spence et al, 2001 ; Ganis et al, 2009 ). Generally, deception has been consistently recognized as more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (Blandón-Gitlin et al, 2014 ; Gamer, 2014 ; Gawrylowicz et al, 2016 ), because deceiving requires more cognitive resources to process the risk or reward calculation, to execute the plans, to speculate on others’ ideas, to inhibit the truth and to produce the new responses in a clever way (Sip et al, 2008 ; Spence et al, 2008 ; Christ et al, 2009 ; Leue et al, 2012 ; Ding et al, 2014 ). Consequently, deception often leads to greater neural responses compared to telling the truth (Sip et al, 2008 ; Ganis et al, 2009 ; Gamer, 2014 ), which could make deception detection feasible.…”

Taxing the brain to uncover lying? Meta-analyzing the effect of imposing cognitive load on the reaction-time costs of lying

“…2 Because RTs are noisy and have to be averaged across sufficient trials to provide a reliable and valid index of deception, and in line with , we excluded studies that did not have at least 20 lie and 20 truth trials (e.g., Ambach, Stark, Peper, & Vaitl, 2008;Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005;Gawrylowicz et al, 2016;Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003b). We also excluded studies that used a correlational rather than an experimental design (e.g., Suchotzki, Crombez, Debey, van Oorsouw, & Verschuere, 2015).…”

Revisión de las técnicas de carga cognitiva inducida en el ámbito de la detección de la mentira

“…En Fenn et al (2015) es a través del orden inverso en intención futura, donde tienen se les pregunta por una tarea que harán en el futuro. Gawrylowicz et al (2016) realizan una tarea simultánea de simulación de conducción mientras son preguntados. Li et al (2018) por su parte crean una situación de simulación de un ordenador que detecta la mentira y al que tienen que engañar.…”

“…En Gawrylowicz et al (2016), donde se realiza la tarea de conducción, no encontraron diferencias entre los sinceros y los mentirosos ensayados, pero sí con los no ensayados. Los tiempos de reacción aumentaron un poco con la entrevista.…”

“…Luego dos grupos de observadores debe evaluar si dicen la verdad o no según su criterio (experimento 1) o según 10 claves de comportamiento que se les indican (experimento 2). Gawrylowicz et al (2016) 90 participantes…”