“…The functional-computational approach that is assumed in evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology has been criticized as useless to account for consciousness by many theorists (e.g., Block, 1995;Chalmers, 1996). Even if one defines consciousness functionally-as in global workspace accounts (Baars, 1988(Baars, , 1998Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), or an integrative account (Tononi, 2008(Tononi, , 2012, or even in an account that emphasizes learning (Meuwese, Post, Scholte, & Lamme, 2013)-one can still argue that attention is an early adaptation and that the alleged functions of consciousness must be a much later addition to the repertoire of cognitive capacities, thus demonstrating their dissociation based on this early versus late adaptation argument. Furthermore, there seems to be consensus concerning the claim that consciousness appeared recently in the evolution of cognitive capacities.…”