Does Organizational Form Affect Investment Decisions?*

Ciliberto, Federico

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6427.2006.00276.x

Cited by 46 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…It was quite rare until the mid-1990s, and then declined rapidly thereafter. Integration between hospitals and physician practices peaked in 1996 at approximately 40 percent of all hospitals, and declined thereafter (Burns and Pauly, 2002;Ciliberto, 2005). This pattern was repeated with vertical integration of hospitals into the insurance market, although the extent of vertical integration was never as great as between hospitals and physicians (Burns and Pauly, 2002).…”

Section: Empirical Evidence On Vertical Restraintsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Competition in Health Care Markets

2011

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This paper reviews the literature devoted to studying markets for health care services and health insurance. There has been tremendous growth and progress in this field. A tremendous amount of new research has been done in this area over the last 10 years. In addition, there has been increasing development and use of frontier industrial organization methods. We begin by examining research on the determinants of market structure, considering both static and dynamic models. We then model the strategic determination of prices between health insurers and providers where insurers market their products to consumers based, in part, on the quality and breadth of their provider network. We then review the large empirical literature on the strategic determination of hospital prices through the lens of this model. Variation in the quality of health care clearly can have large welfare consequences. We therefore also describe the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of market structure on quality of health care. The paper then moves on to consider competition in health insurance markets and physician services markets. We conclude by considering vertical restraints and monopsony power.

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Section: Empirical Evidence On Vertical Restraintsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Competition in Health Care Markets

2011

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“…Studies in the former group, including Woodruff [2002], Baker and Hubbard [2004], and Ciliberto [2006] address the question: why do firms vertically integrate?…”

Section: Relationship To Previous Studies I1 Empirical Analysis Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games: An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

Kubo¹

2010

SSRN Journal

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This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

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“…In the 1990s, the integration of tertiary and non-tertiary care hospitals increased (Huckman 2006;Nakamura, Capps, and Dranove 2007), as did mergers between hospitals and physician practice groups (Ciliberto 2006;Cuellar and Gertler 2005). In the health economics literature, these types of mergers are referred to as vertical integrations (Ciliberto 2006;Ciliberto and Dranove 2005;Cuellar and Gertler 2005;Gal-Or 1999;Gaynor 2005;Huckman 2006;Nakamura, Capps, and Dranove 2007), and similar motives are hypothesized for both.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the health economics literature, these types of mergers are referred to as vertical integrations (Ciliberto 2006;Ciliberto and Dranove 2005;Cuellar and Gertler 2005;Gal-Or 1999;Gaynor 2005;Huckman 2006;Nakamura, Capps, and Dranove 2007), and similar motives are hypothesized for both. Thus, I review previous literature on hospital-physician integration as well as on hospital mergers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hospital Mergers and Referrals in the United States: Patient Steering or Integrated Delivery of Care?

Nakamura¹

2010

INQUIRY

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Many tertiary care hospitals (acquirers) acquire non-tertiary care hospitals (targets), and some of these mergers lead to a significant increase in referrals from the target to the acquirer. This study examines the hospitals' motives for integration and for increasing referrals using hospital discharge data from the Pittsburgh area. I develop and estimate a model of referral choice based on a reputation mechanism. The results suggest that low- or average-quality acquirers exploit their targets' monopoly power to steer patients to the acquirers. Distinguished acquirers, on the other hand, seem to have motives other than patient steering, including the integrated delivery of care.

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Does Organizational Form Affect Investment Decisions?*

Cited by 46 publications

References 17 publications

Competition in Health Care Markets

Competition in Health Care Markets

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games: An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

Hospital Mergers and Referrals in the United States: Patient Steering or Integrated Delivery of Care?

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