Does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption? When the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

STRATEGIC CONFLICTS ON THE HORIZON: R&D INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES

“…using patents, and the interaction with environmental policy (David and Sinclair-Desgagn 2005;Goeschl and Perino 2016;Hall and Helmers 2013;Laffont and Tirole 1996). In terms of the type of innovation, environmental R&D can either be cost-reducing (Bosetti et al 2009;Hall and Helmers 2013), pollution-reducing (Perino and Requate 2012;Poyago-Theotoky 2007) or, as in the present paper, technology enabling (Barrett 2006;Hoel and De Zeeuw 2010).…”

“…Another reason for inefficiencies in the technological innovation process is that future deployment of the technologies, usually involving significant externalities, will be prone to strategic considerations as well. Anticipating the resulting suboptimal patterns of technology deployment, in turn, has the potential to alter incentives for technology R&D. This mechanism has been explicitly raised by Popp (2010) 1 and is present, yet less prominently, in a couple of other contributions (Hall and Helmers 2013;Perino and Requate 2012;Barrett 2006;Hoel and De Zeeuw 2010). It is this impact of anticipated technology deployment profiles on R&D incentives that is the focus of the present inquiry.…”

“…Important examples include CO 2 abatement technologies (Bosetti et al 2009;Perino and Requate 2012;Poyago-Theotoky 2007) and 'breakthrough technologies' like no-emission * I thank two anonymous reviewers, the editor David Maddison, conference participants at the World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists (WCERE) 2014 in Istanbul, the AUROE Young Academics Workshop 2014 in Kiel, seminar participants at the FZU-ZEW Monthly Brown Bag Seminar, the Brown Bag Seminar at the Chair of Environmental Economics, and participants of the climate engineering summer schools at Harvard University 2013 and Heidelberg 2014 for their helpful comments. The research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG), grant HE 7551/1-1.…”

On Adverse Effects of Consumers’ Attaching Greater Importance to Firms’ Ethical Conduct

“…5 The bad technology is available at no cost. The firm's fixed cost from adopting the good technology is a random variable c, with c ∈ [0, C] according to the cumulative distribution function F(c) (as is assumed in, e.g., [21]). There is a probability α > 0 that the firm will adopt the good technology out of its own moral concerns as long as the adoption costs are less than m < C (this is similar to, e.g., [22]).…”

Time and tide wait for no man pioneers and laggards in the deployment of CCS

“…2 There is a growing strand of literature on the incentives to adopt new technologies and the best timing; see, e.g. Requate (2005), van Soest (2005 and Perino and Requate (2012). 3 A study by Shackley et al (2007Shackley et al ( : 77, 2009 finds relatively high public acceptance in the Netherlands, Great Britain and the group of Central and Eastern European Countries.…”