Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study

Giritligil, Ayça Ebru; Sertel, Murat R.

doi:10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Moreover, this way of questioning the chair is independent of the voting rule that is being elicited; whereas questions about weights only make sense when considering PSRs. Asking who should win in specific profiles has been used in experimental settings investigating the feeling of justice of individuals [13], but, to the best of our knowledge, the use of such questions to systematically guide an elicitation process about voting rules is novel. This is similar to favor, in decision theory, direct choice questions ("please choose either a or b") compared to, say, questioning the decision maker about the shape of her utility function.…”

Section: Question Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination

Napolitano

Cailloux

Viappiani³

2021

Algorithmic Decision Theory

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Social choice deals with the problem of determining a consensus choice from the preferences of different agents. In the classical setting, the voting rule is fixed beforehand and full information concerning the preferences of the agents is provided. This assumption of full preference information has recently been questioned by a number of researchers and several methods for eliciting the preferences of the agents have been proposed. In this paper we argue that in many situations one should consider as well the voting rule to be partially specified. Focusing on positional scoring rules, we assume that the chair, while not able to give a precise definition of the rule, is capable of answering simple questions requiring to pick a winner from a concrete profile. In addition, we assume that the agent preferences also have to be elicited. We propose a method for robust approximate winner determination and interactive elicitation based on minimax regret; we develop several strategies for choosing the questions to ask to the chair and the agents in order to converge quickly to a near-optimal alternative. Finally, we analyze these strategies in experiments where the rule and the preferences are simultaneously elicited.

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Section: Question Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination

Napolitano

Cailloux

Viappiani³

2021

Algorithmic Decision Theory

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“…Any majority enjoys some satisfaction from each alternative and the majoritarian compromise rule picks the alternative(s) which give(s) the best possible satisfaction to the largest majority. 1 Note that this voting system has been the subject of many investigations in the literature such as Brams and Kilgour (2001), Dindar and Lainé (2022), Giritligil and Sertel (2005), Kondratev and Nesterov (2018), Laffond and Lainé (2012), Llamazares and Peña (2015), Merlin et al (2006Merlin et al ( , 2019, Nurmi (1999), among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule

2023

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We study the relationships between two well-known social choice concepts, namely the principle of social acceptability introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018), and the majoritarian compromise rule introduced by Sertel (1986) and studied in detail by Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). The two concepts have been introduced separately in the literature in the spirit of selecting an alternative that satisfies most individuals in single-winner elections. Our results in this paper show that the two concepts are so closely related that the interaction between them cannot be ignored. We show that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is even and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition so that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is odd. Moreover, we show that when we restrict ourselves to the three well-studied classes of single-peaked, single-caved, and single-crossing preferences, the majoritarian compromise rule always picks a socially acceptable alternative whatever the number of alternatives and the number of voters.

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“…The notion of a root itself (as a core preference structure independent of the names of the alternatives and of the voters) appeared first in Sertel and Giritligil [10,16]. In these experimental studies, the subjects are confronted with hypothetical preference of an hypothetical electorate over some abstract set of alternatives at which several SCRs of focus choose distinct winners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures

Eğecioǧlu

Giritligil

2013

The Journal of Mathematical Sociology

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We introduce a new probability model, namely Impartial, Anonymous and Neutral Culture model (IANC), for sampling public preferences concerning a given set of alternatives. IANC treats public preferences through a class of preference profiles named roots, where both names of the voters and of the alternatives are immaterial. The general framework along with the theoretical formulation through group actions, an exact formula for the number of roots, and the description of a symbolic algebra package that allows for the generation of roots uniformly are presented. In order to be able to obtain uniform distribution of roots for large electorate size and high number of alternatives which lead to combinatorial explosions, the machinery we developed involves elements of symmetric functions and an application of the Dixon-Wilf algorithm. Using Monte-Carlo methods, the model we develop allows for a testbed that can be used to answer various questions about the properties and behaviors of anonymous and neutral social choice rules for large parameters. As applications of the method, the results of two MonteCarlo experiments are presented: the likelihood of the existence of Condorcet winners, and the probability of Condorcet and Plurality rules to choose the same winner. 1The Impartial, Anonymous and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference StructuresAbstract We introduce a new probability model, namely Impartial, Anonymous and Neutral Culture model (IANC), for sampling public preferences concerning a given set of alternatives. IANC treats public preferences through a class of preference profiles named roots, where both names of the voters and of the alternatives are immaterial. The general framework along with the theoretical formulation through group actions, an exact formula for the number of roots, and the description of a symbolic algebra package that allows for the generation of roots uniformly are presented. In order to be able to obtain uniform distribution of roots for large electorate size and high number of alternatives which lead to combinatorial explosions, the machinery we developed involves elements of symmetric functions and an application of the Dixon-Wilf algorithm. Using Monte-Carlo methods, the model we develop allows for a testbed that can be used to answer various questions about the properties and behaviors of anonymous and neutral social choice rules for large parameters. As applications of the method, the results of two MonteCarlo experiments are presented: the likelihood of the existence of Condorcet winners, and the probability of Condorcet and Plurality rules to choose the same winner.

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Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study

Cited by 14 publications

References 7 publications

Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination

Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination

Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule

The Impartial, Anonymous, and Neutral Culture Model: A Probability Model for Sampling Public Preference Structures

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