Does India’s Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment?

Dutta, Puja Vasudeva; Murgai, Rinku; Ravallion, Martin; Walle, Dominique van de

doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0130-3_ch1

Cited by 78 publications

(136 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…A recent compendium of articles released by the MORD features articles highlighting MGNREGA's impact on increasing livelihood and income security, decreasing the incidence of poverty, increasing food intake, reducing mental depression and positively affecting health outcomes (Shah, 2012). The self-targeting nature of the Act is also highlighted as a success, with the poorest and most marginalised communities and women seeking work under the Act (Dutta et al, 2012). The more negative writings, many from media sources, talk about the leakages and corruption in the scheme (Pati, 2008;Bhalla, 2011), and highlight the mismanagement in implementation and appropriation of workers' wages (Sabhikhi, 2012).…”

Section: Towards Realising Rights-based Social Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India: Examining Pathways towards Establishing Rights-Based Social Contracts

Chopra

2014

Eur J Dev Res

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This article aims to assess the type of social contracts that led to the passage of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) by analysing the debates prevalent during the Act's formulation, and the underlying beliefs about the existing social contract. The article argues that while existing social contracts shape the design of social policies, each policy may also have an aspiration of a particular type of social contract built into its design. Accordingly, it analyses the nature of social contract envisioned in the design of the MGNREGA, and the extent to which this social contract is being realised through the Act's implementation.Cet article vise à examiner les types de contrats sociaux qui ont conduit à l'adoption de la loi nationale Mahatma Gandhi sur la garantie de l'emploi dans les zones rurales (MGNREGA), en analysant les débats qui ont prévalu au cours du processus d'élaboration de cette loi, ainsi que les croyances sous-jacentes concernant le contrat social existant. Nous faisons valoir que, bien que les contrats sociaux existants façonnent l'élaboration des politiques sociales, la conception de chaque politique peut également intégrer l'ambition d'un type particulier de contrat social. Cet article propose donc une analyse de la nature du contrat social envisagé dans la conception du MGNREGA, et dans quelle mesure ce contrat social se concrétise à travers la mise en oeuvre de la Loi.

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Section: Towards Realising Rights-based Social Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India: Examining Pathways towards Establishing Rights-Based Social Contracts

Chopra

2014

Eur J Dev Res

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“…For a more detailed corroboration of sensitiveness of excess demand to district-level poverty, see . For a more recent corroboration of this finding, see Dutta et al (2012). 8.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 52%

Targeting Accuracy of the NREG: Evidence from Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu

et al. 2012

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This article focuses on the targeting accuracy of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREG) in two Indian states, Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Tamil Nadu (TN), based on household data for 2009-2010. To overcome difficulties arising with the use of a specific poverty threshold, stochastic dominance tests are used. MP demonstrated much better targeting than TN in terms of the FGT class of poverty indices over a wide range of poverty thresholds. This is significant as the proportion of poor is twice as high in MP compared with TN. It raises doubts about prevailing views that there is greater under-provision of jobs under NREG in the poorer states. The selfselection of the poor was undermined and (relatively) affluent crowded in because of high NREG wage (relative to agricultural wage). Transfer benefits in the form of additional income to the poor were small mainly due to short spells of work and daily wages lower than minimum wage.Cet article s'inte´resse a`la pre´cision du ciblage du NREG (Programme National de Garantie de l'Emploi Rural) dans deux É tats indiens, le Madhya Pradesh (MP) et le Tamil Nadu (TN), et s'appuie, pour le faire, sur des donne´es de 2009-2010 sur les me´nages. Pour surmonter les difficulte´s associe´es a`l'utilisation d'un seuil de pauvrete´spe´cifique, nous effectuons des tests de dominance stochastique. L'É tat de MP s'ave`re effectuer des ciblages plus pre´cis que l'É tat du TN, en termes des indices FGT de pauvrete´, et ceci pour un large e´ventail de seuils de pauvrete´. Ce constat est important car la proportion de pauvres est deux fois plus e´leve´e dans l'É tat du MP que dans celui du TN. Il remet en question l'ide´e dominante selon laquelle l'insuffisance de cre´ation d'emplois, dans le cadre du NREG, est plus forte dans les e´tats les plus pauvres. Les taux de salaires e´leve´s (relatifs aux salaires agricoles) offerts dans le cadre du NREG ont entrave´l'auto-se´lection des pauvres et le nombre de me´nages (relativement) plus aise´s a fortement augmente´. Les prestations de transfert sous la forme de revenus supple´mentaires pour les pauvres e´taient peu e´leve´es en raison, essentiellement, des bre`ves pe´riodes de travail et des salaires journaliers infe´rieurs au salaire minimum.

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“…In general, female participation in the NREGA was much higher than the share of women in work in the casual wage labour market in all states, and this gap is generally larger in states where women participate less in the casual labour market (Dutta et al, 2012). National-level data shows that only 30 per cent of women across India took decisions on day-to-day affairs of the household, and there is evidence that NREGA earnings are being translated into greater control over household spending decisions.…”

Section: Launch Of Various Mass Broad-based Rules-based Welfare Schemesmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Together these effects imply that the participation rate declines slowly until above the richest half of the consumption distribution. Despite pervasive rationing, the scheme does reach poor people, STs and SCs and those with lower education (Shankar et al, 2011;Dutta et al, 2012;Liu and Barrett, 2013). Although the scheme was politically personalised and renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act after 2009, it did not simply become a Congress patronage scheme.…”

Section: Launch Of Various Mass Broad-based Rules-based Welfare Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Consensus Unravels: NREGA and the Paradox of Rules-Based Welfare in India

McCartney

Roy

2016

Eur J Dev Res

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The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was launched in India in 2006, and a widespread view is emerging that though flawed the NREGA has been successful in providing employment to the poorest. There was wide agreement among scholars before 2006 that India would not be able to promote such a regime of rules-based welfare and that schemes providing targeted patronage, open to political and bureaucratic manipulation and clientelism, would continue to be the norm. This article confirms that the NREGA was indeed a paradox and constructs a number of hypotheses using a political economy framework to explain it.La Loi nationale sur la garantie de l'emploi rural (NREGA en anglais) a été lancée en Inde en 2006 et l'avis général qui est en train d'émerger reconnait que bien qu'imparfaite, NREGA a réussi à fournir des emplois aux plus pauvres. Il y avait un large consensus parmi les chercheurs avant 2006 que l'Inde ne serait pas en mesure de promouvoir un tel régime basé sur des règles de protection sociale et que les initiatives prévoyant un patronage ciblé, ouvertes à la manipulation politique et bureaucratique et au clientélisme continueraient à être la norme. Ce document justifie le fait que la NREGA était en effet un paradoxe et construit un certain nombre d'hypothèses en utilisant un cadre d'économie politique de l'expliquer.

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Does India’s Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment?

Cited by 78 publications

References 8 publications

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India: Examining Pathways towards Establishing Rights-Based Social Contracts

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India: Examining Pathways towards Establishing Rights-Based Social Contracts

Targeting Accuracy of the NREG: Evidence from Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu

A Consensus Unravels: NREGA and the Paradox of Rules-Based Welfare in India

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