Does Higher Transparency Lead to More Search in Online Auctions?

Haruvy, Ernan; Leszczyc, Peter T. L. Popkowski; Ma, Yu

doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01357.x

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The interaction between time to bid and jump bidding is a key strategic consideration for bidders (Haruvy, Popkowski Leszczyc, and Ma 2014; Kwasnica and Katok 2007) and is of paramount importance. Bidders with a high cost of time will place higher jump bids (Kwasnica and Katok 2007).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our data for Studies 2 and 3 come from a local nonprofit auction website in a midsized metropolitan area in North America with a population greater than one million. At the time of the study, the site had roughly 9,000 registered members and is the same site as discussed in Haruvy, Popkowski Leszczyc, and Ma (2014). Bidders (1) are notified of auction events through emails to the site's user base, (2) are registered users, and (3) have been exposed to both charity and noncharity ascending-bid auctions.…”

Section: Field Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions

Haruvy

Leszczyc

2018

Journal of Marketing

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The authors investigate compliance behavior and revenue implications in winner-pay and voluntary-pay auctions in charity and noncharity settings. In the voluntary-pay format, the seller asks all bidders to pay their own high bid. The authors explore motives and boundary conditions for compliance behavior based on internal and external triggers of social norms. The voluntary-pay format generates higher revenue than the winner-pay format for charity auctions, despite imperfect compliance, but it generates lower revenues in noncharity settings. To characterize bidding strategy, the authors study time to bid, auction choice, and jump bidding and find evidence that bidders in voluntary-pay auctions more commonly use jump bidding and late entry. The findings have important implications for marketing managers, augmenting the growing stream of empirical auction studies and work on corporate social responsibility. Specifically, combining an auction with a charitable cause may result in increased revenues, but managers should ensure that they are accounting for differential compliance rates between auction formats. Even if low-compliance bidders can be identified and screened out, doing so is not advantageous, because noncompliant bidders bid up prices.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Field Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions

Haruvy

Leszczyc

2018

Journal of Marketing

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“…Namely, Ariely and Simonson (2003) find that eBay ending prices are about 15 percent higher than online prices, even though bidders can easily and quickly obtain online price information with a search on the web. Other investigators also observe significant price dispersion in ending prices (on average over 10 percent) for concurrent identical product auctions (Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010;Haruvy et al, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…However, this percentage is likely to be inflated since some bidders participate in multiple auctions because they require multiple tickets. Haruvy et al (2012) report a bidder overlap of 37.6 and 53.0 percent in a controlled field experiment and find that greater transparency, number of concurrent auctions, and degree of overlap between auctions increase cross-bidding.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of elapsed time to switch between auctions

Gönül

Leszczyc²

2012

Journal of Research in Interactive Marketing

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2012),"Consumer perceptions of online consumer product and service reviews: Focusing on information processing confidence and susceptibility to peer influence"If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services. AbstractPurpose -Online auctions, which have become an important aspect of online sales, are generally regarded as stand-alone events. However, in contrast to offline auctions, online auctions can be subject to the presence of simultaneous competing auctions. The purpose of this study is to model and estimate determinants of elapsed time to switch across concurrent auctions, with special attention to unobserved heterogeneity among bidders. Design/methodology/approach -Since auctions are dynamic and since the current winning bid progresses over time, the authors study time dependency over the course of an auction with hazard function models. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, the paper uses a latent class approach, which identifies bidder segments based on both observed and unobserved factors. Findings -The findings show significant heterogeneity across bidders, revealed by their varying degrees of propensity to switch across auctions. The three segments of bidders are The Inerts -about 30 percent, The Switchers -less than 10 percent, and The In-Betweens. According to the findings, bidders can induce other bidders to switch to a concurrent auction by responding quickly to the current high bid. Moreover, the paper finds a surprisingly high degree of inertia and reluctance to switch towards the end of the auction when bidding is most critical. Originality/value -To the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to model elapsed time to switch from one auction to a simultaneous auction for an identical product, and to investigate determinants of the time required to switch, with special attention to unobserved heterogeneity across bidders.

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“…Simultaneous auctions are fully overlapping and allow for bidders to cross-bid or switch among auctions. Cross-bidding among simultaneous auctions has been empirically observed (Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng 2006;Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc 2010;Haruvy, Popkowski Leszczyc, and Ma 2014) and results in increased bidders and bids in both auctions, and thus tends to increase sellers' revenues (Beil and Wein 2009).…”

Section: Bidder Behavior and Auction Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Posted Prices: the Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms

Spann

Zeithammer

Bertini³

et al. 2017

Cust. Need. and Solut.

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Driven by the low transaction costs and interactive nature of the internet, customer participation in the price-setting process has increased. These changes were first brought about by the rise of online auctions in the early 2000s, followed by the emergence of newer participative mechanisms.Today, platforms such as eBay have popularized online auctions on a global scale, Priceline has made headlines with its name-your-own-price (NYOP) business model, and Humble Bundle has enabled independent musicians and game developers to market their works through pay-what-youwant (PWYW) pricing. Advertising exchanges conduct several hundred million individual auctions per day to sell online advertising slots. These are just a few examples of participative pricing in transactions among consumers or businesses. In parallel, academic research on participative pricing has blossomed in recent years, with an overarching concern over the profitability and other marketing implications these mechanisms have on sellers and buyers.The present paper contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we propose a definition of participative pricing mechanisms, as well as a useful taxonomy. Second, we discuss the current understanding by synthesizing conceptual and empirical academic literature. Third, we outline promising research questions with a key focus on the related behavioral aspects of buyers and sellers.3

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Does Higher Transparency Lead to More Search in Online Auctions?

Cited by 11 publications

References 37 publications

A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions

A Study of Bidding Behavior in Voluntary-Pay Philanthropic Auctions

Determinants of elapsed time to switch between auctions

Beyond Posted Prices: the Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms

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