Does Heart or Head Rule Donor Behaviors in Charitable Crowdfunding Markets?

Gleasure, Rob; Feller, Joseph

doi:10.1080/10864415.2016.1171975

Cited by 141 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…This result might be explained by warm-glow giving, which is a form of altruism and describes funders' motivation to give money to generate self-esteem benefits. While purely altruistic funders may be subject to free-riding and crowding-out issues, warm glow explains why crowding-out as described above is no absolute phenomenon (Gleasure and Feller 2013). Therefore, warm glow may be the reason why individuals tend to give more to people in need.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observational learning and willingness to pay in equity crowdfunding

Walther

Bade

2020

Bus Res

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This study examines interdependencies between investments of equity crowdfunders. Based on hand-collected data from a well-established equitycrowdfunding platform, we find strong indication that investors observe previous investments to determine their willingness to pay for equity shares. Furthermore, the investment behavior of predecessors may lead investors to deviate from average investment behavior. In particular, investors are willing to pay more than the average investment, when the focal campaign is hot or there have been many large investments in the campaign. Remarkably, a high number of all previous investments over the entire period of the campaign as well as co-financing by presumably sophisticated investors negatively influence willingness to pay. This suggests that crowd investors are subject to partial crowding-out. These findings are different on the platform level, which suggests that investors' behavior is rather information than sentiment-driven.

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Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observational learning and willingness to pay in equity crowdfunding

Walther

Bade

2020

Bus Res

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“…Cooperation and altruistic action are key prosocial behaviors in our society and pivotal for a number of desirable outcomes, such as engagement in charitable work, social support, increased cohesion as well as increased productivity within teams and better organizational performance [17] [25][26] [45]. It seems therefore evident why cooperation and altruistic action are in great demand, not only in our society but also in organizational contexts and why explaining such behaviors has been an aspiration of scholars for many years [6][11] [13][25] [26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Game Features Give Rise to Altruism and Collective Action? Implications for Cultivating Cooperation by Gamification

Riar¹,

Morschheuser²,

Hamari³

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

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Due to the general gamification of our culture and society as well as the proliferation of games in our everyday activities, people are increasingly looking at games and gamification as a source for cooperation and other prosocial behaviors. However, not all game features lead to increased cohesion, cooperation or collaboration between people. While some games indeed are geared for cooperation, majority of games also aim toward competition or just non-social activity. Therefore, a prominent research problem exists in understanding how different game and gamification design may lead to altruistic sentiment and collective action. In this study, we investigated how the engagement with cooperative game features relates to the emergence of altruism and whether altruism leads to the formation of we-intentions in a gaming context. We employed data gathered among players of the augmented reality game Ingress (N=206) and analyzed the data using PLS-SEM. The results show that game features can give rise to altruism and that altruism can invoke we-intentions via cooperative goal structures (we-goals) of individuals. In addition to providing important insights regarding how cooperation emerges within games, this study provides implications for cultivating cooperation by gamification.

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“…Several static aspects of what motivates the crowd to pledge have been identified: feelings of identity/community [Gerber et al, 2012], quality of communication [Beaulieu andSarker, 2013, Mollick, 2014], the entrepreneur's social capital [Mollick, 2014], and altruism towards the entrepreneur [Gleasure and Feller, 2016a]. The dynamics of funding behavior are less explored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

It's never too late: Funding dynamics and self pledges in reward-based crowdfunding

Crosetto

Regner²

2018

Research Policy

104

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Crowdfunding recently emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. We use pledge-level data from Startnext, the biggest German platform, to gain insights on funding dynamics and pledgers' motivations. We find that the majority of projects that eventually succeed are not on a successful track at 75% of their funding period. These late successes are boosted by information cascades during the final 25% of the funding duration. We conclude -in contrast with earlier literature -that project success is only partially path-dependent. While early pledges do anticipate project success, a lack of them does not necessarily mean that projects will fail. Interviews and questionnaire responses indicate that projects' communication efforts play a role in making severely under track projects succeed eventually. Moreover, our dataset uniquely allows us to quantify the extent of self funding. Self pledges account for about 10% of all initial pledges and 9% of all pledges that secure funding. Nonetheless, the late surges at severely under track projects are mostly driven by external funders. Furthermore, we find no evidence of subsequent herding triggered by self pledges.JEL classifications: L26, D03, G32, 031

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Does Heart or Head Rule Donor Behaviors in Charitable Crowdfunding Markets?

Cited by 141 publications

References 65 publications

Observational learning and willingness to pay in equity crowdfunding

Observational learning and willingness to pay in equity crowdfunding

How Game Features Give Rise to Altruism and Collective Action? Implications for Cultivating Cooperation by Gamification

It's never too late: Funding dynamics and self pledges in reward-based crowdfunding

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