Does hallucinating involve perceiving?

Abstract

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states, states which include both perceiving and misperceiving, is ordinary perception. 2 Cases of perception are those in which a subject successfully perceives her mind-independent surroundings. When such is the case, it is natural to think of perception as constitutively involving a conscious, sensory relation between the subject and her surroundings, in which those surroundings look, appear, or are presented in some sensory way to the subject. We can call this relation perceptual contact. On this view, perception is, at least primarily, a matter of perceptual contact with worldly objects, where a worldly object is a particular object or event that is part of the material and mind-independent world. This would be a relational view of perception. 3 As I see it, the simplest, and perhaps most naive theory of perceptual states simply generalizes the intuitive characterization of perception to all perceptual states, giving us: Relationalism: 4 The property of a perceiver being in a perceptual state is identical to the property of a perceiver being in perceptual contact with some worldly object(s). 51 This paper benefitted from the feedback of my dissertation committee members, Otavio Bueno, Elijah Chudnoff, Simon Evnine, and Susanna Schellenberg, all of whom helped shape my view. The thorough comments of an anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Studies also helped clarify the paper's argument and organization. Finally, the members of New York University Abu Dhabi's Normativity conference in February 2016, and the members of the American University of Beirut's philosophy department also contributed with their comments to my presentation on part of this paper.4 'Relationalism' is typically used to describe a view of veridical perceptual states, or states of perception. I use the term in a broader sense throughout (unless otherwise stated), applying it to all perceptual states, and not just veridical ones. 5 Here I characterize relationalism as involving the identification of perceptual states with states of perceptual contact with worldly objects. But weaker construals of the view are possible. For instance, one can take perceptual states to constitutively involve perceptual contact with objects without being identical to such contact. I adopt this construal for ease of exposition, nothing in what follows rests specifically on accepting the stronger identity commitment.

Hallucination and Its Objects

“…is causing the 'perfect ' hallucination" (2014, 95). Ali (2018) argues that this view can be extended to cover hypothetical cases where there are no such "external factors." Masrour (2020) goes further, suggesting a relationalist treatment for psychologists' hallucinations.…”

On the Possibility of Hallucinations

“…Thus, the main premise of Causal Path is undermotivated. Moreover, there are better explanations for the intuition that the rubber mallet 23 For similar views about the brain in a vat cases see Chalmers 2005, Gallagher & Zahavi 2012, Thompson & Cosmelli 2011, Raleigh 2014, and Ali 2018 A further question is whether John's experience is an illusion or a veridical experience. Opinions can differ here.…”

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

“…For an account of what this entails and what might be said in favor of it, see Fish (2009) and Soteriou (2016). See Ali (2018) and Masrour (forthcoming) for a non-disjunctive version of naïve realism. and its properties.…”