Does fisheries management incentivize non-compliance? Estimated misreporting in the Swedish Baltic Sea pelagic fishery based on commercial fishing effort

Abstract

Hentati-Sundberg, J., Hjelm, J., and Ö sterblom, H. Does fisheries management incentivize non-compliance? Estimated misreporting in the Swedish Baltic Sea pelagic fishery based on commercial fishing effort. -ICES Journal of Marine Science, 71: 1846 -1853. Fisheries management agencies and fishing industry representatives depend on reliable estimates of fish biomass and mortality for the determination of sustainable catch levels. Lack of data or misreporting may be reasons for unreliable stock assessment, which, in turn, may result in advice that does not reflect the availability of fisheries resources. It has been suggested that the mixed pelagic trawl fisheries in the Baltic represent a case of biased estimates of fish biomass and mortality resulting from misreporting. Here, we estimate the degree of misreporting in the Swedish pelagic fishery (1996 -2009) and propose an approach for reconstructing historical catches based on commercial effort data. The analysis suggests that total catches have been underestimated during part of our study period and that systematic misreporting of species composition has taken place over the whole study period. The analysis also suggests that there is overcapacity in the fishery and that such economic incentive could explain the general patterns of misreporting. Applying our method for fisheries with suspected misreporting could significantly improve assessment accuracy, reduce uncertainty and thereby allow for a better link between catches and resource levels.

The quality of compliance: investigating fishers’ responses towards regulation and authorities

“…A recent study of the Swedish pelagic Baltic Sea fishery, for example, estimated that between 2002 and 2007, these fishers underreported sprat and herring catches by 57% and 48%, respectively (Hentati‐Sundberg et al . ). Fishers themselves also highlighted these differences in compliance levels in survey's conducted on the matter (Eggert and Ellegård ; Jagers et al .…”

“…Another example of creativity is the tendency of some Swedish fishers to maintain a diversity of target species to avoid becoming too dependent on species that are heavily regulated, such as cod, herring or eel (Hentati‐Sundberg et al . ). Other, less innocent, examples include the ‘flagging out’ of ships, i.e.…”

Reflecting on the importance of open communication and social capital for the co-creation of knowledge in Irish fisheries

“…Prior to the full implementation of the Landing Obligation one interviewee frankly stated: 'your model will be rubbish if based on logged catch data'. This is an extremely important disconnect, as when fishers perceive their reporting as contributing only to their monitoring and enforcement, it provides perverse incentives for misreporting (Gallic and Cox, 2006;Hentati-Sundberg et al, 2014). More work is required, therefore, to build trust and understanding so that fishers do not feel that they will be penalized by providing accurate catch information, but instead that they can actively contribute to the scientific process, more accurate stock assessments and successful EBFM.…”