Does Explicit Expectation Really Affect Preparation?

Abstract

Expectation enables preparation for an upcoming event and supports performance if the anticipated situation occurs, as manifested in behavioral effects (e.g., decreased RT). However, demonstrating coincidence between expectation and preparation is not sufficient for attributing a causal role to the former. The content of explicit expectation may simply reflect the present preparation state. We targeted this issue by experimentally teasing apart demands for preparation and explicit expectations. Expectations often originate from our experience: we expect that events occurring with a high frequency in the past are more likely to occur again. In addition to expectation, other task demands can feed into action preparation. In four experiments, frequency-based expectation was pitted against a selective response deadline. In a three-choice reaction time task, participants responded to stimuli that appeared with varying frequency (60, 30, 10%). Trial-by-trial stimulus expectations were either captured via verbal predictions or induced by visual cues. Predictions as well as response times quickly conformed to the variation in stimulus frequency. After two (of five) experimental blocks we forced participants by selective time pressure to respond faster to a less frequent stimulus. Therefore, participants had to prepare for one stimulus (medium frequency) while often explicitly expecting a different one (high frequency). Response times for the less frequent stimulus decreased immediately, while explicit expectations continued to indicate the (unchanged) presentation frequencies. Explicit expectations were thus not just reflecting preparation. In fact, participants responded faster when the stimulus matched the trial-wise expectations, even when task demands discouraged their use. In conclusion, we argue that explicit expectation feeds into preparatory processes instead of being a mere by-product.

Expectation mismatch: Differences between self-generated and cue-induced expectations

“…Probability matching (3) is reflected in choosing alternatives according to the relative frequency with which they are rewarded. For instance, Umbach et al (2012) observed that participants predicted the stimulus that was presented in 60% of the trials in about 60% of the trials. For the stimuli presented in 30% of the trials and in 10% of the trials expectation frequencies matched presentation frequencies as well.…”

“…In the cued expectation condition, the participant would be shown a gray star as cue (cf. Umbach et al, 2012) or be shown the word "star" as cue and asked to verbalize it (c.f. Kemper et al, 2012).…”

Tied to expectations: Predicting features speeds processing even under adverse circumstances

“…Note that dissociations between prediction and preparation are possible (e.g., Jiménez & Méndez, 2013). Umbach et al (2012) showed that participants can keep up with a response deadline assigned to a less frequent stimulus while predicting the frequent stimulus to occur. Third, aftereffects of prediction (mis)match did not seem to vary with frequency: When predicting the most frequent stimulus prediction, mismatch seemed to have the same consequences for the next trial as when predicting the less frequent stimulus, despite much more likely mismatches in the latter case.…”

Lost in dissociation: The main paradigms in unconscious cognition

“…In particular, it appears that conscious expectation is not so straightforwardly dependent or subordinate as the Perruchet effect claims it is, having actually a causal role in unconscious cognitive processing, namely by contributing to unconscious preparation for action (see Umbach et al, 2012).…”