Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?

Marinov, Nikolay; Nomikos, William George; Robbins, Josh

doi:10.1086/681240

Cited by 35 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The results presented above strongly suggest that incumbent Israeli governments manipulate counterterrorism policies in an effort to boost their Marinov et al (2015) find systematic evidence across 50 countries that contributed troops to the war in Iraq that the number of troops committed was lower the closer the contributing government was to an election. A specific example comes from the 2004 United States elections, the first since the September 11th attacks.…”

Section: Generalizing Beyond Israelmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…As elections approach, however, politicians must be concerned not only with achieving positive security outcomes but also with ensuring the citizens recognize their role in achieving these outcomes. Indeed, Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins (2015) demonstrate that the timing of upcoming national elections played a role in determining countries' willingness to commit troops to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, and argue that this pattern is the result of temporal variation in electoral incentives.…”

Section: Electoral Incentives and Policy Manipulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Matthew J. Nanes is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science. He is a 2015-2017Israel Institute Doctoral Fellow and a 2015-2016…”

Section: Declaration Of Conflicting Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political Violence Cycles

Nanes

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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How do electoral incentives affect the counterterrorism policies chosen by reelection-seeking incumbents? This article tests the argument that governments alter their choice of security strategies as elections approach to signal competence to potential voters. Which policy they select should depend on the intended audience of the signal. Governments seeking support from their partisan base should select different policies than those courting the support of moderates. Using data on Israel-West Bank checkpoint closures and casualties in the Palestinian territories between 2000 and 2013, I find evidence that Israeli governments manipulate security strategies in the run-up to elections in a manner consistent with an attempt to attract support from core voters. As elections approach, left governments become more dovish on security, while right governments become more hawkish. The relationship between partisanship and policy choice raises concerns that electoral incentives may induce democratic governments to select inefficient or suboptimal security strategies around election time.

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Section: Generalizing Beyond Israelmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Electoral Incentives and Policy Manipulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political Violence Cycles

Nanes

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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“…I control for the number of casualties incurred by a country during the War on Terror (WoT) using Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins (2015) data on troop casualties in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Forces. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of troop casualties at the time of the election that followed the revelation of participation in RDI since the incumbent's party has been in office.…”

Section: Casualties (Log)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ireland) indicates a lower number of casualties. Parties in office that incurred a greater number of causalities should be more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation of participation in RDI as it highlights the human costs of the war effort and foreign policy failure (Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins 2015). This measure also captures WoT alliance membership (excluding countries that did not incur casualties).…”

Section: Casualties (Log)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

Cordell

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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From 2001 to 2005, over a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated in a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites. While governments in some states have not been punished for participating, others have incurred political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 extraordinary rendition program? I argue that left of center governments, particularly those in democracies, suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the name of national security. I test the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat at the election following the revelation of participation in extraordinary rendition using a matched sample where the party in office at the time of participation remained the same. The analysis provides empirical support for my theoretical argument.

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Polarization, Casualty Sensitivity, and Military Operations: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Lee

2024

Polarization and US Foreign Policy

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Does Electoral Proximity Affect Security Policy?

Cited by 35 publications

References 20 publications

Political Violence Cycles

Political Violence Cycles

The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

Polarization, Casualty Sensitivity, and Military Operations: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

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