Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?

Abstract

Recent empirical research seems to show that emotions play a substantial role in moral judgment. Perhaps the most important line of support for this claim focuses on disgust. A number of philosophers and scientists argue that there is adequate evidence showing that disgust significantly influences various moral judgments. And this has been used to support or undermine a range of philosophical theories, such as sentimentalism and deontology. I argue that the existing evidence does not support such arguments. At best it suggests something rather different: that moral judgment can have a minor emotive function, in addition to a substantially descriptive one.

Why do people behave immorally when drunk?

“…This "affective turn" (May 2014) has been an important element in the redirection of research in moral psychology during the past two decades. Piaget (1997) and Kohlberg (1984) had made virtually no room for emotion in their accounts of moral judgment, choosing instead to study moral development as the acquisition of more and more complex reasoning schemas.…”

Emotional reactions to human reproductive cloning

“…Yet reporting disgust, and especially repugnance, may sometimes merely be a way of signalling a negative judgement, such as moral condemnation, rather than the distinct emotion of visceral disgust 15 20 21. We cannot settle the issue here, but it is important for assessing arguments that appeal to the alleged wisdom of repugnance, since the argument would be circular if the term ‘repugnance’ is just meant to be synonymous with ‘wrong’.…”

“…While mental fatigue may slightly influence moral judgements,11 it is unclear whether we should take its ‘wisdom’ seriously if it does not substantially determine whether we think something is right or wrong. Some recent experimental evidence might seem to confirm this second assumption,12 13 but there is reason to doubt that the influence is substantial 14 15 16. Incidental feelings of disgust at best sometimes make moral judgements slightly more harsh, but only if one already believes the relevant action is immoral.…”

What in the World Is Moral Disgust?

“…In the psychological literature, we find that disgust is considered either as a consequence of moral violations, when moral violations elicit disgust; or as a moralizing emotion, when disgust at certain things causes people to consider them immoral [Pizarro et al 2011]; or as an amplifier of moral judgments, when disgust independently experienced makes moral judgments harsher (see Wheatley and Haidt [2005], and critical discussion in May [2014]). …”